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Abstract 
We examined the extent to which semantic informativeness, consistency with 
expectations and perceptual salience contribute to object prioritisation in scene viewing and 
representation. In scene viewing (Experiments 1-2), semantic guidance overshadowed perceptual 
guidance in determining fixation order, with the greatest prioritisation for objects that were 
diagnostic of the scene’s depicted event. Perceptual properties affected selection of consistent 
objects (regardless of their informativeness) but not of inconsistent objects. Semantic and 
perceptual properties also interacted in influencing foveal inspection, as inconsistent objects 
were fixated longer than low but not high salience diagnostic objects. While not studied in direct 
competition with each other (each studied in competition with diagnostic objects), we found that 
inconsistent objects were fixated earlier and for longer than consistent but marginally 
informative objects. In change detection (Experiment 3), perceptual guidance overshadowed 
semantic guidance, promoting detection of highly salient changes. A residual advantage for 
diagnosticity over inconsistency emerged only when selection prioritisation could not be based 
on low-level features. Overall these findings show that semantic inconsistency is not prioritised 
within a scene when competing with other relevant information that is essential to scene 
understanding and respects observers’ expectations. Moreover, they reveal that the relative 
dominance of semantic or perceptual properties during selection depends on ongoing task 
requirements.    
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Public significance statement 
 
There has been long-standing debate about whether we look sooner at objects that are 
unexpected for the scene (i.e., semantically inconsistent objects). The present study shows that 
they are not prioritised over the most expected and informative objects for the event depicted in 
the scene (i.e., diagnostic objects), especially when these objects also stand out visually from 
their surroundings. Unexpected objects are looked at later, and when they are perceptually salient 
they slow down how quickly we select the most expected and informative objects in the scene. 
This study also shows that the impacts of object perceptual salience and object-scene semantic 
associations are task-dependent: semantics appear the most important source of guidance when 
viewers explore the scene for memorisation, whereas perceptual salience has a greater impact 
when changes have to be found. These findings provide new key insights into the roles of high- 
and low-level factors in how we view and remember scenes. 
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The Elephant in the Room: Inconsistency in Scene Viewing and Representation 
 
Information selection during both online processing and memory representation is one of 
our fundamental and most striking abilities. Fundamental, because selection of a few, key aspects 
enables us to adapt and act flexibly in everyday life, where we have to face rich, noisy and 
changing environments. Striking, because it deals with an overwhelming flow of information 
(estimated in 10 billion bits per second, only considering the rate of data transmission from the 
retina, see Koch et al., 2006), where we are exposed to multiple high-level and low-level 
information sources at the same time. If we are to understand how we select information from 
the world around us to serve ongoing behaviour, it is therefore central to understand what 
dimensions contribute to prioritising particular information amongst competing sources. 
There remains a long-standing debate about how prioritisation of objects for inclusion, 
maintenance and availability in visual representations takes place. In particular, while most 
previous research suggests that perceptual and semantic factors interact in affecting our viewing 
behaviour and memory (but see Kollmorgen, Nortmann, Schröder & Köning, 2010), it is still 
unclear how this interplay takes place. 
One view is that perceptual salience has a predominant influence: selection in scenes 
proceeds sequentially from the most salient point, following a hierarchy of salience weights (e.g., 
Itti & Koch, 2000; Koch & Ullman, 1985; Parkhurst, Law & Niebur, 2002). While consensus has 
almost been reached about the inappropriateness of models strictly based on pixel-to-pixel 
differences in low-level features like luminance, colour or orientation to account for human 
behaviour (Tatler, Hayhoe, Land & Ballard, 2011, for review; but see Borji & Itti, 2013, and 
Latif, Gehmacher & Castelhano, 2014), one of the main unresolved issues is about what happens 
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when the inclusion of features within objects is considered (e.g., Borji, Sihite & Itti, 2013a; 
Einhäuser, Spain & Perona, 2008a, Nuthmann & Henderson, 2010; Pajak & Nuthmann, 2013; 
Xu, Jiang, Wang, Kankanhalli & Zhao, 2014). In this framing, it might still be that processing of 
objects follows the sequential rule of perceptual priority (e.g., Underwood, Humphreys & van 
Loon, 2011). Some studies that manipulated perceptual and semantic dimensions orthogonally 
(Coco, Malcolm & Keller, 2013; Pringle, Irwin, Kramer & Atchley, 2001; Spotorno & Faure, 
2011; Underwood & Foulsham, 2006) indicated that when an object is highly salient the effect of 
semantics does not emerge or, at least, is strongly reduced. 
A second view suggests, on the contrary, that semantic factors predominate and may 
completely override perceptual salience. Semantically relevant objects may indeed be 
systematically prioritised even when of lower salience than semantically marginal ones (e.g., 
Chen & Zelinsky, 2006; Einhäuser, Rutishauser & Koch, 2008b; Stirk & Underwood, 2007; 
Tatler et al., 2011; Underwood, Templeman, Lamming & Foulsham, 2008), and this may be the 
case from the early moments of scene inspection (e.g., Henderson, Malcolm & Schandl, 2009; 
Nyström & Holmqvist, 2008, but see Dombrowe, Olivers & Donk, 2010).  However, it has been 
controversial what type of semantic informativeness of an object is the most influential on 
information gathering from a scene. Since the pioneering work by Loftus and Mackworth (1978), 
in particular, we do know that attentional allocation to an object during scene viewing and 
representation may depend on its semantic relationship with the scene context in which it is 
included. However, previous literature has been contradictory on whether strong agreement with 
expectations about object occurrence in the scene (e.g., Coco et al., 2013; O’Regan, Deubel, 
Clark & Rensink, 2000; Pringle et al., 2001; Rensink, O'Regan & Clark, 1997, 2000; Spotorno & 
Faure, 2011) or, on the contrary, strong disagreement (inconsistency) with expectations about 
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object occurrence in the scene (e.g., Bonitz & Gordon, 2008; Brockmole & Henderson, 2008; 
Cornelissen & Võ, 2017; Hollingworth & Henderson, 2000, 2003; Loftus & Mackworth, 1978; 
Stirk & Underwood, 2007; Underwood et al., 2007, 2008) results in greater object prioritisation 
in terms of earlier selection. The studies reviewed above suggest that some semantic processing 
must be going on prior to foveal inspection of the object in order for that object to be selected 
sooner than others. The idea that semantic information may be processed extrafoveally, prior to 
fixation, and may inform fixation selection has been suggested previously (see Tatler, Brockmole 
and Carpenter, 2017).  
Objects can have a powerful role in our understanding of the scene’s core conceptual 
content (i.e., the scene’s gist: see Biederman, 1972; Oliva, 2005; Potter, 1975) either by being 
“diagnostic” (Schyns, 1998) in constructing and confirming scene understanding or by being 
inconsistent, thus violating scene expectations and challenging the initial, potentially incorrect, 
interpretation of the whole image (e.g., Friedman, 1979; Palmer, 1975; Spotorno, Tatler & Faure, 
2013). While both may be highly informative for the semantic understanding the scene, the 
underlying factors that confer this informativeness are fundamentally different. 
A diagnostic object is one that is not only consistent with the meaning of the scene, but is 
essential for that meaning – conveying and catalyzing the scene’s gist through its relationship 
with the co-occurring objects. In every scene representing a real-world situation with agent(s) 
involved in an action, diagnostic objects become semantically important in conveying the sense 
of the depicted event, providing the essential description of the situation (e.g., “a girl looking at a 
flower she has picked up”, “a man trying to fix a broken tap”, see images A and C in Figure 1); 
rather than merely informing a categorical description of the scene (e.g., “a meadow”, “a 
kitchen” for images A and C in Figure 1). This functional understanding of a scene, centred on 
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what we may call the gist for action, is what is crucial in everyday life, and recently Greene, 
Baldassano, Esteva, Beck, & Fei-Fei (2016) suggested that it may be the primary principle of 
scene categorisation. Object diagnosticity contributes to choosing among distinctive (main) event 
interpretations of the scene, and arises largely from an object’s relationship with other objects in 
the scene, which are part of the depicted event. It is the result of a specific semantic network 
within the scene and is tied to the placement of the object. For instance, the diagnostic flower in 
image A (Figure 1) would be no more important than all the other flowers in the image if it were 
placed in the meadow instead of in the girl’s hand. It is the pairing of the diagnostic object’s 
identity with its location that confers the particular meaning to the scene’s event; without a 
flower in that location, the core meaning of the scene would be more about a happy girl on a 
sunny day. In a similar way, the spanner in image C would be less important for the scene if 
placed somewhere on the worktops, and the scene would not offer any strong hint about the 
intention of the man to repair the tap if the spanner were not in his hand. It is clear from these 
examples that both the identity of a diagnostic object and the location at which it occurs are 
informative in their own right – the object maintains some informativeness elsewhere in the 
scene and the location remains important to the scene even when empty – but neither is sufficient 
to provide the diagnostic understanding of the scene’s depiction. Diagnostic objects may 
therefore be prioritised in scene perception due to this crucial role that they play in defining the 
semantic interpretations of the scene: a role that arises from the unique combination of the 
identity of the object and its placement in the scene.  
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM 8 
Informativeness of the inconsistent object arises, on the contrary, from the absence of 
plausible relationships with the co-occurring objects and with the scene context, and contributes 
to the attribution of a plausible category to the scene by challenging the interpretation offered by 
the rest of the scene. To continue with some concrete examples, the microphone, the balloon, the 
rubber ring and the painting in Figure 1 are violating what we would expect in those types of 
scene categories, even before any understanding of the represented events. Therefore, because of 
its semantic isolation – both from other objects and from depicted events – the possibility of 
prioritisation of an inconsistent object appears independent of its specific placement within the 
scene. Indeed, unlike the situation for diagnostic objects, the locations at which inconsistent 
objects occur in scenes would likely be indeed rather uninteresting if empty (as can be seen for 
the images shown in Figure 1).  
Any effects of (diagnostic or inconsistent) object informativeness on the allocation of 
attention may emerge not only in terms of quicker and/or more probable selection of an object, 
but also in longer inspection once the object has been selected. Several studies have shown that 
inconsistency with the scene’s gist leads to longer fixations, probably reflecting the greater effort 
required to identify the object itself (e.g., Biederman, Mezzanotte & Rabinowitz, 1982; 
Friedman, 1979; Gordon, 2004; Mudrik, Lamy  & Deouell, 2010; but see Gareze & Findlay, 
2007) or to solve the conflict of meaning with respect to context (e.g., De Graef, Christiaens & 
d'Ydewalle, 1990; Ganis & Kutas, 2003; Henderson, Weeks & Hollingworth, 1999; 
Hollingworth & Henderson, 1998, 1999; Mudrik et al., 2010). Other studies have instead 
reported that diagnosticity/high predictability in the scene results in a higher proportion of 
fixations and longer fixation duration (Einhäuser et al., 2008a; ‘t Hart et al., 2013). No research, 
however, has considered diagnosticity versus inconsistency when examining effects on attention 
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disengagement. We might expect either shorter inspection of diagnostic than inconsistent 
objects, because there is not the requirement to solve the conflict between the object and the 
scene, or even longer inspection, reflecting greater information uptake concerning the whole 
semantics of the scene.  
Comparisons in previous studies have potentially confounded informativeness and 
consistency, as relevant objects for the scene, either in terms of high consistency/diagnosticity or 
high inconsistency have typically been compared to consistent but semantically marginal objects, 
whose presence does no contribute to determining the gist. To our knowledge, only one study 
has compared high consistency/diagnosticity and inconsistency systematically within the same 
task (Spotorno et al., 2013). Using a change detection paradigm with coloured drawings, some 
advantage was found for diagnosticity, however this was in the context of a complex pattern of 
findings, which appeared affected by the type of change (addition or deletion), and without 
directly contrasting diagnosticity and inconsistency within the same scene in the same trial. 
We should also consider that the semantic relationship between an object and the scene’s 
gist, in terms of both scene category and depicted event, may influence any effects of perceptual 
salience on object prioritisation in scenes. Two opposite possibilities appear plausible according 
to the (scarce) literature. Spotorno and colleagues (2013) suggested that salience acts as a 
preferential filter, promoting further processing of the most salient objects that are also 
diagnostic for the gist. The work of Itti and Baldi (e.g., 2009) suggested that high salience would 
favour, instead, selection of semantically inconsistent objects, as it would foster processing of 
what is surprising and violates expectations. 
The main aim of the present study was to determine whether semantic or perceptual 
information has a predominant influence on prioritisation in scene viewing and memory, when 
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objects compete within a scene. A secondary aim was to consider whether there is any support 
for previous claims that inconsistency is prioritised in scene viewing and memory. This work, 
therefore, provides new insights into the ongoing and unresolved debate about the relative 
influence of semantic and perceptual properties on prioritisation in scenes. We examined object 
prioritisation within scenes by manipulating both the perceptual and semantic relationships 
between the objects and the scene in which they occur. More specifically, we manipulated the 
perceptual relationship by varying the visual conspicuity of objects within the scene defined in 
terms of salience (see Experiment 1 Method). We manipulated the semantic relationship by 
including in each scene an object that was diagnostic for scene’s gist (in order to define the 
depicted event) and another that was highly inconsistent with the gist (considered in terms of 
both scene category and depicted event). To date, no research has analysed direct competition 
between diagnostic and inconsistent objects within the same scene and has considered how it 
could be modulated by the objects’ perceptual salience. These manipulations may provide new 
insights into the relative impacts of high-level and low-level factors in competition for selection 
and how these factors interact in modulating attentional allocation within the online scene and its 
working memory representation. 
In Experiment 1, we examined the role of the competition between the diagnostic object 
and the inconsistent object, and how this varies depending on the perceptual salience of each of 
the two objects, during the course of scene viewing, in a task requiring free exploration of the 
scene for a subsequent memory test. By analysing eye movements, we were able to isolate the 
impacts of context-object semantic associations in scenes, salience and their interplay, on both 
initial selection and further ocular inspection of these two objects. We were also able to compare 
selection and further inspection of either the diagnostic or inconsistent objects in the case of 
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direct competition (both critical objects included in the same scene context) to the case of no 
competition (only one critical object present). Finally, the analysis of the same scenes but 
without the inclusion of one or both of the two critical objects allowed us to consider the impact 
of object presence per se and disentangle any influence due to other properties of the areas of the 
scene (see Region of Interest definition in Method) in which the objects were placed in the other 
experimental conditions, in terms of either residual semantic importance of the empty location 
for the scene, or physical aspects such as the eccentricity or size of these regions. 
To isolate any effects of inconsistency per se suggested by Experiment 1, Experiment 2 
compared competition between the diagnostic object and the inconsistent object to that between 
the diagnostic object and a consistent but not diagnostic (thus of marginal importance to scene 
understanding) object. To control for the placement and perceptual properties of the non-
diagnostic objects, we created a version of each scene in which the inconsistent object was 
replaced by a consistent, but only marginally informative, object of the same salience, placed in 
the same location. The analysis of selection and inspection of consistent, marginally informative 
objects provides an opportunity to assess prioritisation due to semantic informativeness within 
the scene. 
In Experiment 3, we considered the impact of semantic and perceptual factors when 
objects compete for both information selection from the scene and inclusion in scene 
representations in visual working memory. For this, we used a flicker change detection task (e.g., 
Rensink et al., 1997), in which the diagnostic and the inconsistent objects simultaneously 
appeared and disappeared. Successful change detection, when the associated transient signals are 
disrupted, requires not only attentional allocation but also effective comparison of pre/post-
change memory representations (see Rensink, 2002, for review). Failures to detect changes may 
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arise from either filtering at encoding, leading to sparse representations where only objects on 
which attention had been focused are included (e.g., Beck & Levin, 2003; Becker & Pashler, 
2002; Rensink et al., 2000), or from later selection within relatively rich representations, leading 
to difficulties in retrieval or in comparison processes (e.g., Busch, 2013; Fernandez-Duque & 
Thornton, 2000; Varakin & Levin, 2006). The change detection task, therefore, enables us to 
consider how the semantic consistency of the two competing critical objects and their respective 
perceptual salience influence the different processes that are necessary in order to utilise memory 
traces effectively in behaviour guidance, which is the aim of adaptive information prioritisation. 
 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. One-hundred and eighteen students of the University of Dundee, UK (aged 
18-40) participated for course credits. They all had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  The 
experiment was approved by the local Ethics Committee of the School of Psychology and carried 
out in accordance with the provisions of the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki. 
All participants provided written informed consent prior to participating. 
 
Apparatus. The experiment was generated in Experiment Builder (SR Research, 
Canada). It was conducted on a Dell Optiplex 755 computer running OS Windows XP. Stimuli 
were shown on a ViewSonic G90f-4 19-inch CRT monitor, with a resolution of 1024 x 768 
pixels, and a refresh rate of 100 Hz. A chin rest stabilised the eyes about 63 cm away from the 
display. Eye movements were recorded using an EyeLink 1000 at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz 
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(SR Research, Canada). Viewing was binocular, but only the dominant eye was tracked. Eye 
dominance was determined using a variant of the Miles test (Miles, 1928). 
 
Materials. Sixteen coloured cartoon scenes (1024 x 768 pixels, 31.9 x 23.9 deg), plus 
one for the practice trial, were used and presented filling the screen on which they appeared. 
They were modified versions of images used in Spotorno and Faure (2011), originally derived 
from a children’s language test (PFLI: Bortolini, 1995). Since we were interested in the 
competition between diagnostic and inconsistent objects, we did not only consider the situation 
in which just one of these critical objects were present (as was the case in Spotorno et al., 2013) 
but also cases in which both or neither was present. Thus, we created four versions of each scene 
using Adobe Photoshop CS (Adobe, San Jose, CA): (1) both critical objects present, (2) only the 
diagnostic object present, (3) only the inconsistent object present, (4) both critical objects absent. 
The perceptual salience (high or low) of each critical object was manipulated and 
counterbalanced across scenes in order to have four groups of four scenes with critical objects 
belonging to one of the experimental conditions (i.e., both of low salience, both of high salience, 
high salience-inconsistent object paired with low salience-diagnostic target, low salience-
inconsistent object paired with high salience-diagnostic target; see Figure 1). 
 
Pre-testing of materials. Ten independent judges (five males, age: M = 31.5, SD = 4.35, 
none took part in the main experiment) evaluated the semantic consistency and the perceptual 
salience of the critical objects, and the visual complexity of each experimental scene, following a 
procedure similar to that in Spotorno et al. (2013). The scenes had the same size as in 
Experiment 1 and were presented only once, in random order, against a medium-grey 
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background. Five judges evaluated first consistency and then salience, and the others did the 
opposite. All evaluated scene complexity last, before being presented with a new scene. As 
scores were not normally distributed, we report here median and interquartile range values, with 
results of Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests (two tailed). 
With respect to semantic informativeness, judges first indicated up to three objects 
considered as the most important for understanding the scene (like if they had to describe briefly 
the situation depicted) or the most inconsistent with the scene’s meaning; then they rated on a 
Likert scale the probability of occurrence related to the depicted situation in the scene (from 1, 
minimum, to 6, maximum) of the two objects pre-selected as targets by the experimenters. All 
the diagnostic objects in the main experiment were included by at least eight judges within the 
objects indicated as the most strongly contributing to scene meaning, and all the inconsistent 
objects in the main experiment were indicated by all judges as the only inconsistent object in the 
scene. Moreover, diagnostic and inconsistent objects were scored on the Likert scale as having 
on average high (Mdn = 5, IQR = 1) or low probability of occurrence (Mdn = 1, IQR = 1), 
respectively; this difference was highly significant, Z = 11.15, p < .001. 
Perceptual salience was defined as “something highly visible, which captures attention 
and stands out for its physical properties, regardless of its semantics”. Judges indicated up to 
three objects they considered as the most salient. Subsequently, they rated, on the same six-point 
Likert scale, the salience of the two preselected critical objects. The appropriateness of explicit 
judgment of salience given by human observers and their correlations with the output of classic 
bottom-up saliency algorithms have been demonstrated by several studies (e.g., Borji, Sihite & 
Itti, 2013b; Spotorno & Faure, 2011). However, in order to obtain an objective measure, we also 
created salience map for each scene using an implementation (Ezvision: Itti, 2004) of Itti and 
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Koch’s algorithm (e.g., 2000), so that luminance, colour and orientations were taken into account 
as low-level properties in each scene. Highly salient critical objects in the main experiment were 
selected by the model among the first three salient points, indicated by at least eight judges to be 
among the three most (subjectively) salient objects and each scored on average more than 4 
(Mdn = 5, IQR = 1). Critical objects of low salience in the main experiment were not selected by 
the model among the first seven points, never indicated by the judges and each scored on average 
less than 3 (Mdn = 2, IQR = 0). The difference in salience scores between high salience and low 
salience objects was highly significant, Z = 11.12, p < .001. 
Importantly, diagnostic and inconsistent objects did not differ significantly in their score 
of perceptual salience, in both the cases of high salience, Z = 1.19, p = .233, and low salience, Z 
< 1, p = .891, and high and low salient objects did not differ significantly in their score of 
consistency, in both the cases of diagnosticity, Z < 1, p = .656 or high inconsistency, Z = - 1.30, p 
= .192. 
Judges were asked to rate on the six-point Likert scale the visual complexity of the scenes 
by considering the number and spatial organisation of objects. The range of ratings considering 
the average evaluation for each scene was 2.30-3.80 (Mdn = 3, IQR = 1). In addition, the four 
consistency x salience conditions were comparable as for visual complexity of the scene, all Zs < 
1, all ps > .322). 
Mirror-reversed versions of each scene, with and without the two critical objects, were 
created in order to counterbalance between participants the side of the scene in which a given 
critical object was presented. It has indeed been shown that viewers have a leftward bias in 
starting scene inspection (Dickinson & Intraub, 2009; Foulsham & Kingstone, 2010; Nuthmann 
& Matthias, 2014; Ossandón, Onat & König, 2014). In the “original” (evaluated) orientation, two 
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scenes had both objects in the left half, two had both objects in the right half, while the 
remaining had one object in each side. 
 
Procedure. The experiment was conducted individually in a dimly illuminated room. 
Participants were seated in front of the computer screen. They were told that they would see a 
sequence of scenes, and would have to look at them and try to remember as much information as 
possible for a subsequent memory test (that never took place). Prior to the experimental task, 
each participant underwent a randomized nine-point calibration and validation procedure. 
Recalibrations were performed during the task if necessary. Before each trial a single-point 
calibration check was applied as the participant fixated a dot in the centre of a medium grey 
(127, 127, 127) background. This was followed by the scene, which was presented for 5 s, and 
then by a 1-s blank (mid-grey) screen. Thereafter, the experiment automatically proceeded into 
the single-point calibration check for the next trial. 
The experimental trials were presented in random order and each scene appeared only 
once for each participant. Eighteen versions of the experiment were created in order to 
counterbalance across participants the salience and the side of occurrence of the diagnostic and 
the inconsistent objects (either when they competed within the same image or were presented 
alone), and also scene orientation when both critical objects were absent. Eight versions 
presented scenes with either no critical object or with only one critical object, eight versions 
presented scenes with either only one or both critical objects and two versions presented scenes 
where both critical objects were always present.  
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ROI Definition and Data Analysis. The regions of interest (ROIs) for scoring eye 
movements were defined in Matlab 2012b (MathWorks,Inc., Natick, MA, USA) as a rectangle 
that encompassed the critical object and included a margin of about one degree around it (see 
Orquin, Ashby & Clarke, 2016). A fixation was considered as being on a specific ROI if the 
centre of gaze indicated by the eye tracker fell within the boundary of the ROI. 
Raw data were parsed into saccades and fixations using the SR Research algorithm, with 
a minimum fixation duration of 50 ms. We discarded from analyses trials in which the average 
calibration error was ≥ 0.5 deg (101 trials), or the maximum error in one of the calibration points 
was ≥ 1 deg (0 further trials), or the error in the single point calibration check before trial start 
was ≥ 1 deg (a further 34 trials). In total, 135 trials, corresponding to the 7.3% of total data, were 
removed prior to analysis, leaving 1708 trials from 113 participants for analysis.  
Paired sample t-tests showed that diagnostic and inconsistent ROIs did not differ in the 
percentage of screen area that they covered (diagnostic: M = 7.9%, SD = 4.5, inconsistent: M = 
6.3%, SD = 2.7), t (15) = 1.34, p = .201, or the eccentricity of their centres from the centre of the 
screen (diagnostic: M = 9.1 deg, SD = 4.7, inconsistent: M = 9.0 deg, SD = 4.4), t (15) < 1, p = 
.940. Independent samples t-tests were performed to test for any differences in size and 
eccentricity of ROIs containing low and high salience critical objects in order to check that our 
salience dimension was not confounded by these factors. Low and high salience critical objects 
did not differ in terms of size, t(30) < 1, p = .591, or eccentricity, t(14) < 1, p = .777.  
Analyses were run using the lmer() function of the lme4 package (Bates, Mächler, Bolker 
& Walker, 2015) in the R programming environment (The R Foundation for Statistical 
Computing, Version 3.0.3, 2014). We ran linear mixed models (LMMs) with fixed effects 
describing the variables of interest (these varied depending on the comparison under test and are 
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described in the relevant sections of the Results that follow) as predictors, and participants and 
scenes specified as random factors. Where possible, random slope models were used with 
maximal random effects structure (Barr, Levy, Scheepers & Tily, 2013). In cases where the 
maximal model did not converge, we simplified the model in stepwise fashion. First, we 
removed correlations between random-slopes and intercepts. After this, we started by removing 
the slope of the highest order interaction between the fixed effects, and gradually reduced the 
complexity of the model until it converged. Where possible we tried to maintain slopes for the 
interactions that were theoretically important to our analyses – typically those involving the 
interaction between the perceptual properties of the two objects or between perceptual and 
semantic properties. We simplified the items (scenes) term before simplifying the subject term. 
In all cases, we report the most complex model that converged. A full list of model structures 
used in the present study can be found in Appendix 1. 
LMMs have many advantages over traditional ANOVA models. Crucially, they optimise 
power of the experimental design by performing item analysis and allow a simultaneous 
estimation of between-subject and between-item variance. In addition, they are known to be 
more robust than ANOVAs when a design is not fully balanced as a result of data exclusions (see 
Kliegl, Masson & Richter, 2010). 
For each model, we report the predictors’ coefficients (β-values), the SE-values, the t-
values, and the associated p-values for all significant effects (p < .05). Where we find effects that 
approach but do not reach significance (.05 < p < .1) we report t- and p-values, but not report β 
or SE. We also place no interpretive weight on such effects. We do not report effects that fail to 
reach p = .1. P-values are not directly supplied by lme4 package, but were generated using the 
lmerTest library (Kuznetsova, Bruun Brockhoff & Haubo Bojesen Christensen, 2016). When an 
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interaction was significant, we ran follow-up models to explore it. Graphics were created using 
the ggplot2 package (Wickham, 2009). 
 
Results 
Extrafoveal effects of competition between diagnostic and inconsistent objects. 
Figure 2 shows the cumulative probability of fixation for each of the diagnostic and inconsistent 
objects over the first 16 fixations of viewing, for each of the four possible combinations of 
perceptual salience across the two critical objects.  
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The trends in these plots were explored in a Linear Mixed Model to predict the ordinal 
fixation number of the first fixation on the critical object1 with object semantics (inconsistent, 
diagnostic), the salience of the inconsistent object (low, high), the salience of the diagnostic 
object (low, high) as categorical fixed effects. In order to examine and control for any possible 
effect of differences depending upon the side of the scene in which the object appeared, we also 
included object side (left, right) as a categorical fixed effect in the model. Fixed effects were 
coded using sum coding, and all possible interactions between the fixed effects were included in 
the LMM (Model 1.1). Only trials on which both critical objects were fixated at some point in 
viewing (93.6% of trials) were included in this analysis.  
While there was an overall effect of the side of the scene in which the object appeared, 
with objects on the left fixated sooner (M = 4.3 fixations, SD = 3.1) than objects on the right (M 
= 5.6 fixations, SD = 3.3), β = .158, SE = .023, t = 6.98, p < .001, this factor did not interact with 
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any of the other fixed effects in the model. There was a significant effect of object semantics, β = 
.274, SE = .031, t = 8.76, p < .001, with later fixation of the inconsistent object (M = 6.1 
fixations, SD = 3.3) than of the diagnostic object (M = 3.9 fixations, SD = 2.9). There was also an 
effect of the salience of the diagnostic object, β = .132, SE = .053, t = 2.49, p = .029, and 
significant two-way interactions between object semantics and diagnostic object salience, β = 
.059, SE = .028, t = 2.13, p = .037, and between object semantics and inconsistent object 
salience, β = .142, SE = .028, t = 5.16, p < .001. These two-way interactions and effects of 
semantics and salience were qualified by a three-way interaction between the semantics of the 
object, the salience of the diagnostic object and the salience of the inconsistent object, β = .047, 
SE = .022, t = 2.10, p = .037, suggesting that competition for selection between the critical 
objects depended upon the interplay between the semantics and salience of both objects.  
To explore this three-way interaction we ran follow up LMMs for the inconsistent and 
diagnostic objects separately. For the inconsistent object (Model 1.2), the only significant effect 
was that of the side of the screen on which the inconsistent object appeared, β = .161, SE = .034, 
t = 4.70, p < .001, with fewer fixations required to first fixate the inconsistent object when it was 
on the left, than when it was on the right. For the diagnostic object (Model 1.3), we found the 
expected effect of side, β = .165, SE = .036, t = 4.53, p < .001. There was a significant effect of 
the salience of the diagnostic object, β = .192, SE = .078, t = 2.45, p < .030, with high salience 
diagnostic objects being selected sooner than low salience diagnostic objects. The salience of the 
inconsistent object also influenced how soon the diagnostic object was selected, β = .178, SE = 
.079, t = 2.25, p = .043, with diagnostic objects being fixated sooner when the inconsistent object 
was of low salience than when it was of high salience.  
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The unconditional probability of fixating the critical objects for each of the first 12 
fixations (Figure 3) confirmed the selection advantage of the diagnostic object over the 
inconsistent object. We ran paired sample t-tests with Bonferroni correction (corrected α = 
.05/12) to test for differences in the probability of selection between the diagnostic and 
inconsistent objects. The advantage for the diagnostic object was especially evident during the 
first four fixations when the inconsistent object was of low salience (Figure 3, left panels). In 
contrast, when the inconsistent object was highly salient (Figure 3, right panels) neither object 
was more likely to be fixated than the other, except in the case of the first two fixations when 
both objects were high in salience: the diagnostic was more likely to be selected than the 
inconsistent in these first two fixations. 
 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Foveal effects of competition between diagnostic and inconsistent objects. In order to 
consider how the two critical objects were viewed once selected, we ran a Linear Mixed Model 
to predict the total time spent fixating the object during the trial, with the semantics of the object 
(diagnostic, inconsistent), the salience of the diagnostic object (low, high) and the salience of the 
inconsistent object (low, high) as sum coded categorical fixed effects (Model 2.1). 
We found an overall effect of the semantics of the critical object, β = .028, SE = .009, t = 
3.04, p = .003, with more time spent fixating the inconsistent critical object (M = 962 ms, SD = 
551) than spent fixating the diagnostic critical object (M = 862 ms, SD = 562).  There were also 
effects of the salience of the diagnostic object, β = .067, SE = .025, t = 2.64, p = .022, but these 
were qualified by an interaction between these two predictors, β = .035, SE = .008, t = 4.44, p < 
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.001 (Figure 4). A follow-up model (Model 2.2) was run to break down the significant two-way 
interaction using simple effects: diagnostic object salience influenced the time spent fixating the 
diagnostic object, β = .203, SE = .052, t = 3.94, p = .001, but did not influence how long was 
spent fixating the inconsistent object, β = .065, SE = .052, t = 1.26, p = .226. A frequently 
reported finding in previous studies (see Introduction) is longer total fixation duration on 
inconsistent than consistent objects, reflecting more difficult attentional disengagement in the 
case of inconsistency, interpreted as an indicator of difficulties in identify the object or of the 
attempt to solve the semantic conflict the object engenders in the scene. For this reason, we also 
ran a follow-up model of the simple effects of semantic consistency (Model 2.3). We found that 
the inconsistent object was inspected for longer than the critical diagnostic object only when this 
diagnostic competitor was low in salience, β = .126, SE = .024, t = 5.18, p < .001, but not when it 
was high in salience, β = .012, SE = .024, t < 1, p = .603. 
 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Selection in the presence and absence of competition between the critical objects. An 
alternative approach to consider the influence of the competition between the two critical objects 
is to compare situations in which they compete with each other to situations in which they do 
not. However, while we can consider selection of the diagnostic object when it had no 
inconsistent competitor, we cannot consider selection of the inconsistent object when it had no 
highly consistent and informative competitor. Indeed, when the diagnostic critical object was not 
present, the inconsistent was still presented in the context of other objects that could be highly 
meaningful for the scene’s gist. We, therefore, restricted our analyses to considering the 
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diagnostic object when it was or was not presented with an inconsistent competitor (and only for 
cases in which this object was fixated during viewing).  
We ran an LMM to predict the ordinal first fixation number on the diagnostic object 
(Model 3.1) with side of the scene in which the diagnostic object appeared, the salience of the 
diagnostic object, and competition type as categorical fixed effects. The fixed effect of 
competition type had three levels: none, competing with a low salience inconsistent object, 
competing with a high salience inconsistent object. Since our focus here was to compare fixation 
behaviour in the presence and absence of competition between the critical objects, we used 
contrast coding of the fixed effect competition type to compare (1) no competitor vs. a low 
salience competitor and (2) no competitor vs. a high salience competitor. 
The diagnostic object was fixated after fewer fixations when present without a competitor 
(M = 3.7 fixations, SD = 3.2) than when competing with a low salience inconsistent competitor 
(M = 4.3 fixations, SD = 4.0), β = .299, SE = .078, t = 3.84, p < .001, or when competing with a 
high salience inconsistent competitor (M = 6.1 fixations, SD = 4.3), β = .461, SE = .074, t = 6.24, 
p < .001. However, competition type did not interact with any of the other fixed effects. 
Consistent with earlier analyses, there was an effect of object side, β = .129, SE = .023, t = 5.48, 
p < .001, with earlier selection of diagnostic objects on the left. There was a tendency toward 
earlier selection of the diagnostic object when it was high in salience, t = 1.85, p = .086.  
A final way of considering the factors that influence selection of the diagnostic and 
inconsistent objects is to compare selection of a given ROI when it includes the object to when 
the object is absent. We can also compare selection of the ROI when there is a competitor critical 
object elsewhere in the scene to that when there is no other critical object to compete for 
selection. Thus we ran a GLMM to predict the probability that the ROI would be fixated during 
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viewing with semantics of the ROI (that is whether a diagnostic or inconsistent object would be 
in the ROI if the object was present), presence of the diagnostic object and presence of the 
inconsistent object as categorical fixed effects (Model 4.1). The probability of fixating the ROI 
differed between the ROIs in which diagnostic or inconsistent objects would appear, β = .833, SE 
= .113, z = 7.36, p < .001, and was affected by the presence of the diagnostic object, β = .832, SE 
= .118, z = 7.06, p < .001, and the presence of the inconsistent object, β = 1.07, SE = .096, z = 
11.13, p < .001. These effects were qualified by two significant two-way interactions: between 
the semantics of the ROI and the presence of the diagnostic object, β = .763, SE = .111, z = 6.89, 
p < .001, and between the semantics of the ROI and the presence of the inconsistent object, β = 
1.46, SE = .092, z = 15.89, p < .001. To better visualise the pattern in the data, and to illustrate 
the two follow-up models, we plot the data across all conditions of ROI semantics, diagnostic 
presence and inconsistent presence in Figure 5. 
 
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
We ran follow-up GLMMs to consider the diagnostic and inconsistent ROIs separately. 
For the inconsistent ROI (Model 4.2), the only effect was of the presence of the inconsistent 
object, β = 3.66, SE = .326, z = 11.22, p < .001, with far higher likelihood that the ROI would be 
fixated when it contained an inconsistent object than when it was empty. For the diagnostic ROI 
(Model 4.3), there was an effect of the presence of the diagnostic object, β = 1.51, SE = .132, z = 
11.40, p < .001, with a higher probability of fixating the diagnostic ROI when it contained a 
diagnostic object than when it was empty. There was also an effect of the presence of the 
inconsistent object, β = .354, SE = .127, z = 1.99, p = .047, with a lower probability of fixating 
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the diagnostic ROI when an inconsistent object was present in the scene than when no 
inconsistent object was present. 
The above analyses show that the probability of fixating the diagnostic ROI was high 
even when it was empty. However, the probability of fixating this region was still higher when it 
was full than when it was empty. In order to consider the impact of presence of the diagnostic 
object in this ROI in more detail we ran a LMM to predict the ordinal fixation number in which 
this ROI was first fixated, with the side of the scene, the presence of the diagnostic object and the 
presence of the inconsistent object as categorical fixed effects (Model 5.1). We found a 
significant effect of the side of the scene, β = .088, SE = .023, t = 3.92, p < .001, with earlier 
selection when the diagnostic object was on the left than when it was on the right (as expected 
given previous analyses). There was an effect of the presence of the diagnostic object, β = .093, 
SE = .027, t = 3.46, p < .001, with the diagnostic ROI fixated earlier in viewing when it was full 
than when it was empty. This effect was qualified by a two-way interaction between the presence 
of the diagnostic object and the presence of the inconsistent object, β = .052, SE = .024, t = 2.19, 
p = .029. A follow up LMM (Model 5.2) coded to explore simple effects within this interaction 
showed that the presence of the inconsistent object in the scene influenced how soon the 
diagnostic ROI was fixated when it was full, β = .178, SE = .063, t = 2.84, p = .005, but not when 
the diagnostic ROI was empty. 
 
Discussion 
We examined how two objects that are both informative for the semantics of the scene, 
but in opposite directions, are selected when they compete directly for attentional resources 
within the same scene. We compared diagnostic objects, highly contributing in constructing and 
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confirming the whole meaning of the scene, to inconsistent objects, violating viewers’ 
expectations. Our results reveal insights into the effect of this competition during free viewing, 
when observers try to memorise as much as they can about the scene, in preparation for a 
subsequent – here sham – memory test. The insights concern both the selection of the objects for 
foveal inspection and the foveal inspection that follows overt selection.  
There was a clear advantage in terms of earlier selection of the diagnostic object 
compared to the inconsistent object, with the difference appearing particularly prominent during 
the first few fixations within the scene and already emerging in the probability of foveating the 
object with the very first saccade after scene presentation. We can then argue that semantic 
mismatch between an object and the scene is not as important for information prioritisation as is 
diagnosticity for categorising the scene and understanding the event depicted by the scene. 
The relative prioritisation of the diagnostic object, however, was modulated by the perceptual 
properties of the two objects, and was overridden when a low salience diagnostic object 
competed with a high salience inconsistent object. The type of interplay between perceptual 
salience and semantic consistency appears to be of particular interest in our study. Selection of 
the inconsistent object was independent of the salience of either critical object. On the contrary, 
selection of the diagnostic object appeared to be influenced by the salience of both critical 
objects, in opposite directions: enhanced by its own high salience, which resulted in overall 
earlier fixation during viewing, and impaired, with later fixation, by high salience of the 
inconsistent counterpart. 
 Previous research has shown preferential early inspection of the left than of the right half 
of the scene (Dickinson & Intraub, 2009; Foulsham et al., 2013; Nuthmann & Matthias, 2014; 
Ossandón, et al., 2014). In our study, even though we reported a leftward bias for the selection of 
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the critical objects, this bias did not modulate in any way the effects of competition between the 
two objects.   
We were also able to consider the role of competition per se in object selection by 
comparing the situation where both critical objects are present to how the same critical object 
was selected in the absence of this competition. For this consideration, we focused on the 
diagnostic object because the inconsistent object was a semantic singleton with respect to the 
scene’s gist, whereas the diagnostic object was not, with other objects in the scene contributing 
to the gist. We showed that having an inconsistent competitor within the same scene delayed 
selection of the diagnostic object, and this was largely regardless of the salience of either critical 
object.  
Further suggestions about the nature of the informativeness of diagnostic and inconsistent 
objects can be drawn considering how the region containing the critical object was selected when 
it was empty, and whether this selection was influenced by the presence of the competitor. 
Moreover, these are key aspects in order to disentangle any impact due to other intervening 
physical and semantic factors related to the specific region beyond object’s properties. Possible 
confounding physical effects on selection, linked to size (see Spotorno, Malcolm & Tatler, 2015) 
or eccentricity, were minimised as the critical regions of interest did not differ for the diagnostic 
and inconsistent objects in terms of their size or eccentricity in the scene (see Experiment 1 
Method). We found that both regions were more likely to be selected when containing the object 
than when empty, but the difference was much bigger for the region of the inconsistent object, 
which indeed was fixated only in about 25% of cases when it was empty and almost always, 
even though usually after the diagnostic region, when it contained the object. The presence of the 
diagnostic object only gave an overall modest contribution to the selection of the diagnostic 
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region, fixated in slightly more than 70% of the cases even when empty, although later than 
when it included the object. These findings support the idea of diagnosticity being linked to 
specific placement that draws attention for its semantic role within the scene rather than its 
physical properties. Informativeness of the diagnostic object emerges not only from the top-
down influence of global scene context (see Trapp & Bar, 2015) but also from a network of co-
occurrent semantically related and spatially coherent objects, which observers utilise to guide 
eye movements effectively during viewing (Davenport, 2007; Hwang et al., 2011; Mack & 
Eckstein, 2011; Sadeghi et al., 2014; Wu et al., 2014) to the most relevant locations for the 
current task. In this regard, Pereira and Castelhano (2014) proposed that scene context guides the 
eyes to relatively broad, potentially meaningful regions while objects mainly affect which 
placements are selected therein. We may therefore argue that the co-occurring objects in our 
scenes contributed to defining the depicted event and guiding the eyes to this location even when 
it was empty.  
The low likelihood of selecting the region of the inconsistent object when empty and the 
finding that the presence of the diagnostic critical object did not affect selection of this region 
(either empty or not) reinforce the claim that informativeness depending on gist violation is 
concentrated in the inconsistent object, and arises mainly from the relationship between this 
object and the whole scene context. Together with this finding, the fact that, on the contrary, the 
presence of the inconsistent object did influence diagnostic region selection (especially when it 
contained the object) sheds further light on the direction of the competition according to 
semantic consistency in the scene, supporting what we have already described discussing the 
impact of the respective salience of the two critical objects: this competition emerges as an 
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interfering effect of the inconsistent object over the diagnostic, while processing of the 
inconsistent object appears to be largely insulated from processing of the diagnostic object. 
We found that semantics and salience not only influenced the time of object selection but 
also the duration of object inspection once selected. The literature has provided strong evidence 
that violations of a scene’s semantics leads to greater engagement of attention, resulting in longer 
dwell time on inconsistent than consistent objects once selected (e.g., Bonitz & Gordon, 2008; 
Cornelissen & Võ, 2017; De Graef et al., 1990; Gordon, 2004; Friedman, 1979; Henderson et al., 
1999; Loftus & Mackworth, 1978; Underwood et al., 2007; Võ & Henderson, 2009). Our study 
reported this influence, but also showed that it may depend upon the perceptual properties of the 
diagnostic object (see also Coco et al., 2013, for some indication of an interplay between 
perceptual and semantic factors in influencing fixation duration). Longer inspection of the 
inconsistent object than of the diagnostic object was indeed found only when this latter was low 
in salience, while when it was high in salience viewers spent a similar amount of time on each 
object. This was because dwell time lengthened on high salience compared to low salience 
diagnostic objects.  
A key question remains unanswered by Experiment 1 concerning prioritisation of the 
critical objects: how much are the effects of the competition for attentional resources specifically 
due the semantic identity of the non-diagnostic object, inconsistent with the rest of the scene and 
with expectations? The effects of the salience of the inconsistent object on selecting and 
inspecting the diagnostic object that we found in Experiment 1 could arise from the co-
occurrence of strong perceptual (salience) and semantic (inconsistency) signals, but could be 
perceptual effects independent of semantic factors. In order to test this possible explanation of 
our findings, Experiment 2 juxtaposed the diagnostic object with a consistent but semantically 
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marginally informative object that had the same salience (high or low) as the inconsistent object 
and replaced it in the same location in half of the trials. This manipulation allowed us to 
disentangle informativeness from mere scene consistency. We were, therefore, able to consider 
whether the manner in which competition is mediated between objects depends upon their 
semantic importance within the scene and whether there is any evidence that inconsistent objects 
are prioritised or de-prioritised relative to consistent but only marginally informative objects 
matched for salience and placement in the scene.  
 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants. Seventy-two participants (aged 18-40) took part in this study for course 
credits or for no remuneration. Data were collected across three laboratories: in Aberdeen (26 
participants), Glasgow (22 participants), and Nice (24 participants). The experiment was carried 
out in accordance with the provisions of the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki.  
 
Apparatus. The experiment was generated in Experiment Builder (SR Research, 
Canada). Stimuli were shown at 32 x 24 degrees in all laboratory setups2. Eye movements were 
recorded using an EyeLink 1000 at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz (SR Research, Canada). Viewing 
was binocular, but only the dominant eye was tracked. 
 
Materials. These were as used in Experiment 1, but with an additional version of each 
scene created, in which the inconsistent object was replaced with an object that was consistent 
with the scene, but of marginal informativeness rather than being diagnostic (we will refer to this 
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object as the marginal object in this study). For each scene, the marginal object that we added 
was chosen to be of similar size to the inconsistent object it replaced. Furthermore we used the 
same salience model used for the scenes in Experiment 1 (Ezvision implementation: Itti, 2004) to 
ensure that the marginal object matched the inconsistent object that it replaced in terms of low-
level salience, and we confirmed that it did (as we maintained the same criterion as in 
Experiment 1 to consider whether an object was of low or high salience): all high salience 
marginal objects were included within the first three points selected by the model, whereas all 
low salience marginal objects were not included within the first seven points selected by the 
model. 
Pre-testing of materials. We pre-tested the stimuli in order to confirm that the marginal 
object was (1) consistent with the scene, but (2) indeed of marginal informativeness for the 
scene. Subjective evaluations of consistency, defined in terms of probability of occurrence in the 
scene, and informativeness of the new added object with respect to the scene’s general meaning 
were supplied in a pilot study by ten new judges (4 males, age: M = 31.5, SD = 7.5) on a six-
point Likert scale (1 = minimum, 6 = maximum), in counterbalanced order between participants. 
The new objects were rated as highly consistent (Mdn = 6, IQR = 1) but of low informativeness 
(Mdn = 1, IQR = 1). 
 
Procedure. As in Experiment 1, except that both critical objects were present in all trials 
and the semantic consistency of the non-diagnostic object (inconsistent or consistent) was 
manipulated as a within-participants manipulation. In order to fully counterbalance assignment 
of images to conditions across participants, and so that each participant viewed each scene only 
once, four versions of the experiment were created. 
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ROI Definition and Data Analysis. The regions of interest (ROIs) for scoring eye 
movements were defined in the same way as for Experiment 1. ROIs for marginal objects did not 
differ significantly either in size (M = 6.5% of screen area, SD = 2.9) from those for inconsistent 
objects (M = 6.3% of screen area, SD = 2.7), t (15) = 0.80, p = .438, or in eccentricity, t (15) = 
0.24, p = .817.  
We discarded from analyses trials in which the average calibration error was ≥ 0.5 deg 
(77 trials), or the maximum error in one of the calibration points was ≥ 1 deg (15 further trials), 
or the error in the single point calibration check before trial start was ≥ 1 deg (a further 8 trials). 
In total, 100 trials, corresponding to the 9.1% of total data, were removed prior to analysis, 
leaving 1002 trials from 66 participants for analysis. 
LMMs were run as in Experiment 1 to explore selection and inspection of the critical 
objects in the scene. Given the lack of any interaction between the side of the scene and our 
variables of theoretical interest in Experiment 1, we excluded this fixed effect in the analyses that 
follow.  For each measure, we first modelled the competition between diagnostic and 
inconsistent objects to test the robustness and replicability of findings in Experiment 1. We then 
modelled the competition between diagnostic and marginal objects in order to see whether this 
competition was modulated by the same factors as that between diagnostic and inconsistent 
objects. Finally, we compared selection of marginal and inconsistent objects (although never in 
direct competition with each other) in order to consider whether selection of the non-diagnostic 
critical object was influenced by its consistency with the scene.   
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Results 
Extrafoveal selection of the critical objects. Figure 6 shows the cumulative probability 
of fixation for each of the diagnostic, marginal and inconsistent objects over the first 16 fixations 
of viewing, for each of the four possible combinations of perceptual salience across the two 
critical objects. The patterns evident in these plots were explored by running LMMs to predict 
ordinal first fixation number on the critical objects.  
 
FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
An LMM comparing diagnostic to inconsistent critical objects was run to test whether the 
findings of Experiment 1 were replicated within Experiment 2 (Model 6.1). We found very 
similar patterns of significant effects as in Experiment 1. Crucially, we found the same three-way 
interaction between object semantics, the salience of the diagnostic object and the salience of the 
inconsistent object as we did in Experiment 13, β = .077, SE = .027, t = 2.86, p = .004. Follow-up 
LMMs showed that the ordinal fixation number on which the inconsistent object was first fixated 
(Model 6.2) was not significantly influenced by the salience of either object, although the effect 
of inconsistent object salience approached significance, t = 1.91, p = .082. In contrast, diagnostic 
objects (Model 6.3) were selected sooner when they were high in salience, β = .220, SE = .095, t 
= 2.31, p = .039, or when the inconsistent object was low in salience, β = .235, SE = .096, t = 
2.44, p = .030. Thus, selection of diagnostic and inconsistent objects when in competition with 
each other in Experiment 2 fully replicated that found in Experiment 1.  
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To consider whether the competition between the diagnostic and marginal objects is 
mediated by the same factors as the competition between the diagnostic and inconsistent objects 
we ran an LMM to compare selection of diagnostic and marginal objects (Model 7.1). Diagnostic 
objects were selected earlier (M = 4.2 fixations, SD = 3.5) than marginal objects (M = 8.1 
fixations, SD = 4.5), β = .463, SE = .039, t = 11.9, p < .001, and were selected earlier when high 
in salience than when low in salience, β = .161, SE = .065, t = 2.46, p = .029. There was 
significant two-way interaction between object semantics and diagnostic object salience, β = 
.095, SE = .030, t = 3.14, p = .002. A follow-up model to look at simple effects of salience in this 
interaction (Model 7.2) showed that the diagnostic object was selected earlier when it was high 
in salience than when it was low in salience, β = .512, SE = .144, t = 3.57, p = .002, but the 
salience of the diagnostic object did not affect selection of the marginal object. Looking at 
simple effects of semantics (Model 7.3), we confirmed the advantage of the diagnostic over the 
marginal object both when the diagnostic object was low in salience, β = .735, SE = .100, t = 
7.38, p < .001, and when it was high in salience, β = 1.12, SE = .099, t = 11.5, p < .001.  
There was also an interaction between object semantics and marginal object salience, β = 
.099, SE = .030, t = 3.28, p = .001. A model of simple effects of salience in this interaction 
(Model 7.4) showed no significant effects, but an approaching effect of earlier selection of the 
diagnostic object when the marginal object was low in salience, t = 1.84, p = .083. Once again, 
simple effects of semantics within this interaction (Model 7.5) confirmed the advantage of the 
diagnostic over the marginal object both when the marginal object was low in salience, β = 1.25, 
SE = .101, t = 11.1, p < .001, and when it was high in salience, β = .727, SE = .095, t = 7.62, p < 
.001. 
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The three-way interaction between object semantics and the salience of each of the two 
critical objects that was present in Experiment 1 and for the comparison between diagnostic and 
inconsistent objects in Experiment 2, was not found for the comparison between diagnostic and 
marginal objects, β = .008, SE = .030, t = 0.27, p = .788.  
An alternative way to consider the potential influence of inconsistency in the competition 
between objects is to compare selection of the marginal and inconsistent objects. These objects 
were never placed in direct competition with each other, but comparing selection of these objects 
(which were always a competitor for the diagnostic object) allows us to consider whether 
selection of these objects is influenced by their semantic relationship with the scene. An LMM to 
predict the ordinal fixation number on which the object was first selected with fixed effects of 
object semantics (marginal, inconsistent), diagnostic object salience and non-diagnostic (i.e. 
marginal or inconsistent) object salience (Model 8.1) showed a significant effect of object 
semantics, with inconsistent objects selected sooner (M = 6.6 fixations, SD = 4.0) than marginal 
objects (M = 8.1 fixations, SD = 4.5), β = .174, SE = .030, t = 5.81, p < .001. We also found a 
significant two-way interaction between the semantics and salience of the non-diagnostic object, 
β = .060, SE = .030, t = 2.00, p = .046. However, this interaction should be treated with caution 
as the follow-up model of simple effects in this interaction found no effect of salience for 
marginal or inconsistent objects (Model 8.2), while it showed the expected earlier selection of 
inconsistent than marginal objects for both low salience objects, β = .228, SE = .089, t = 2.56, p 
= .011, and high salience objects, β = .469, SE = .082, t = 5.75, p < .001 (Model 8.3).  
Figure 7 shows that the result we found in Experiment 1 for the unconditional probability 
of fixating the diagnostic and inconsistent objects for each of the first 12 fixations was well 
replicated in Experiment 2. Figure 8 shows that these patterns differed somewhat for trials in 
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which the diagnostic and marginal objects were both present. The selection advantage of the 
diagnostic object over the marginal object is evident. We ran paired sample t-tests with 
Bonferroni correction (corrected α = .05/12) to test for differences in the probability of selection 
between the diagnostic and marginal objects. The advantage for the diagnostic object was 
evident during at least the four or first five fixations for all situations except when the diagnostic 
object was low in salience and the marginal object was high in salience.  
 
FIGURES 7 and 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
Foveal inspection of the critical objects. As for our analysis of extrafoveal selection, we 
first tested the replicability of our findings from Experiment 1 by modelling the data when the 
diagnostic and inconsistent objects were present in the scene (Model 9.1). Replicating our 
findings from Experiment 1, we found longer fixation times on inconsistent objects (M = 930 ms, 
SD = 513) than diagnostic objects (M = 902 ms, SD = 596), β = .018, SE = .009, t = 2.08, p = 
.038, and longer total fixation times on critical objects when the diagnostic object was high in 
salience, β = .080, SE = .026, t = 3.07, p = .010. These effects were qualified by a two-way 
interaction between the semantics of the critical object and the salience of the diagnostic object, 
β = .023, SE = .009, t = 2.73, p = .006; the nature of this interaction is almost identical to that 
observed in Experiment 1 (Figure 9, Left). A follow-up model of the simple effects of semantics 
within this interaction (Model 9.2) showed that the inconsistent object was inspected longer than 
the critical diagnostic object only when this diagnostic competitor was low in salience, β = .085, 
SE = .027, t = 3.20, p = .002, but not when it was high in salience; this result replicates that in 
Experiment 1. We also looked at simple effects of diagnostic object salience within this 
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interaction (Model 9.3). Inspection time of the diagnostic object was longer when it was high in 
salience, β = .210, SE = .053, t = 3.96, p = .001, confirming the result of Experiment 1. However, 
unlike Experiment 1, inspection times were marginally longer on the inconsistent object when 
the diagnostic object was high in salience, β = .111, SE = .053, t = 2.10, p = .052.  
 
FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
Unlike in Experiment 1, we also found a two-way interaction between the semantics of 
the critical object and the salience of the inconsistent object, β = .024, SE = .009, t = 2.81, p = 
.005 (Figure 9, Right). A follow-up model of the simple effects of semantics within this 
interaction (Model 9.4) found that viewing time did not differ between diagnostic and 
inconsistent objects when the salience of the inconsistent object was low; however, inconsistent 
objects were viewed for longer than diagnostic objects when the salience of the inconsistent 
object was high, β = .081, SE = .026, t = 3.17, p = .002. A model of the simple effects of 
inconsistent object salience in this interaction (Model 9.5) found no effects of salience on either 
the diagnostic or inconsistent object. 
When comparing foveal inspection of the diagnostic and marginal objects (Model 10.1) 
we found an overall longer inspection of diagnostic objects (M = 942 ms, SD = 611) than 
marginal objects (M = 635 ms, SD = 401), β = .088, SE = .009, t = 10.0, p < .001, two-way 
interactions between object semantics and diagnostic objects salience and between object 
semantics and marginal object salience, and a three-way interaction between object semantics, 
diagnostic objects salience and marginal object salience, β = .024, SE = .009, t = 2.77, p = .006 
(Figure 10). Follow-up models showed that inspection time for the marginal object (Model 10.2) 
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was not significantly influenced by the salience of either object, but there was a non significant 
trend toward a two-way interaction between diagnostic and marginal object salience, t = 1.86, p 
= .088. For the diagnostic object (Model 10.3) inspection time was only influenced by the 
salience of the diagnostic object, β = .110, SE = .040, t = 2.77, p = .016, with longer inspection of 
the diagnostic object when it was of high salience (M = 1187 ms, SD = 668) than when it was of 
low salience (M = 689 ms, SD = 416). We also considered simple effects of semantics within the 
three-way interaction (Model 10.4) and confirmed longer inspection time on diagnostic than 
marginal objects when they were of similar salience or when the diagnostic was higher in 
salience, all ts > 3.98, all ps < .001; when the marginal object was more salient than the 
diagnostic object, we found longer inspection of the marginal object, β = .072, SE = .033, t = 
2.20, p = .028.  
 
FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE 
 
Comparing inspection time on the marginal and inconsistent objects (Model 11.1), we 
found an overall effect of non-diagnostic object semantics, with longer inspection of inconsistent 
than marginal objects, β = .098, SE = .009, t = 11.3, p < .001. There were significant two-way 
interactions between non-diagnostic object semantics and the salience of each critical object in 
the scene, which were qualified by a three-way interaction between non-diagnostic object 
semantics, diagnostic objects salience and marginal object salience, β = .038, SE = .009, t = 4.35, 
p < .001. A model of simple effects of salience within the three-way interaction for inspection 
time (Model 11.2) confirmed that inspection time on the inconsistent object was longer than that 
on the marginal object in all cases, ts > 6.40, ps < .001, except when the non-diagnostic object 
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was high in salience and the diagnostic object was low in salience, where we found no 
significant difference in inspection times.  
 
Discussion 
In Experiment 2, the inclusion of objects that were consistent but semantically marginally 
informative, placed in the same location and having the same perceptual salience as the 
inconsistent object, allowed two key comparisons in order to better understand the nature of the 
competition between objects. Comparing diagnostic and inconsistent objects (as in Experiment 
1) allowed us to characterise competition when both objects were highly informative but differed 
in terms of their consistency with the scene. Comparing diagnostic and marginal objects allowed 
us to characterise competition when both objects were consistent with the scene but differed in 
terms of their informativeness about the scene’s depicted event. In this way, we could isolate 
effects arising from semantic informativeness and from semantic consistency within these 
competitive situations.  
The results of Experiment 2 about the competition between the diagnostic object and the 
inconsistent object for attentional resources during selection replicated exactly what we found in 
Experiment 1, showing once more that the diagnostic object is selected earlier that the 
inconsistent counterpart, and that this effect emerges during the initial fixations within the 
scenes. Moreover, this advantage of the diagnostic object disappeared only when that object was 
low in salience and its (inconsistent) competitor was high in salience. In that case, as reported in 
Experiment 1, the time course of fixation selection was similar for both critical objects. 
We found – not surprisingly – that the diagnostic object was prioritised over the marginal 
object, which appears (from Figures 6-8) to be even greater than the advantage of the diagnostic 
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object over the inconsistent one. This finding suggests that consistency and informativeness both 
contribute to prioritising objects in scene viewing.  
Considering how perceptual salience may modulate object selection for competition 
between consistent (diagnostic or marginal) objects, we found that it only influenced how early 
the diagnostic object was selected, with earlier selection of highly salient diagnostic objects; the 
salience of the marginal object did not influence how soon either object was selected. We did 
also find a tendency for high salience marginal objects to delay selection of the diagnostic object, 
but not to the point that the diagnostic object was selected later than the marginal one. When 
comparing competing diagnostic and inconsistent objects, the pattern of findings reproduced that 
reported in Experiment 1, with the diagnostic object selected earlier when it was highly salient 
and later when the inconsistent competitor was highly salient. Inconsistent object selection 
showed only a weak tendency to be influenced by that object’s salience (while it appeared totally 
unaffected in Experiment 1). Overall, we can conclude that the pattern of influence of salience 
on selection varies according to both the object’s consistency and semantic informativeness. 
More specifically, perceptual properties of consistent objects do not appear to modulate the time 
course of selection of other objects in the scene substantially, and this seems to be largely 
independent on their informativeness. Perceptual properties of inconsistent (and, therefore, 
informative) objects appear instead to act by modulating ocular selection of what conveys the 
core meaning of the scene. 
In our experiment, marginal and inconsistent objects never occurred in direct 
competition, thus we cannot comment on how their respective perceptual properties might 
interact. We can only note that, showing no salience effects when comparing selection of these 
two kinds of objects, our finding differs from that reported by Coco and colleagues (2013), who 
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found quicker selection of high salience than low salience inconsistent objects, with no salience 
impact on selection of consistent objects. These authors, however, reported this result only for 
eye movements in an object-naming task and not during free viewing.   
A key finding of Experiment 2 is that, ruling out any effect of placement within the 
scene, we found that inconsistent objects were selected earlier than (consistent) marginal objects, 
showing thus prioritisation due to the object’s semantics (we also found a significant interaction 
involving semantics and salience, but follow-up models failed to find evidence of salience effects 
on selection of these objects). Taken together with the overall advantage of diagnosticity for 
selection in both Experiment 1 and 2, this finding suggests that previous reports of earlier 
selection of inconsistency (e.g., Bonitz & Gordon, 2008; Brockmole & Henderson, 2008; 
Cornelissen & Võ, 2017; Loftus & Mackworth, 1978; Underwood et al., 2007, 2008) may have 
arisen from comparisons with consistent but low informative objects for the scene. They might 
have arisen, thus, by the confusion between the dimension of informativeness, which should 
promote selection, with that of simple consistency, which is less important for ongoing scene 
perception and memory once the scene’s meaning has been recognised.  
To sum up, from our study we can claim that inconsistency does have an informative 
value affecting selection during scene inspection. More specifically, we may hypothesise that 
this is due to signalling potential errors in scene interpretation. We can also conclude that once 
informativeness for the scene is controlled for, inconsistency does not lead to any preferential 
attentional allocation for selection, but the contrary. On this point, ours is the first study to 
supply clear evidence that, with comparable informativeness, highly consistent objects are 
prioritised over inconsistent ones during a free-viewing task. Indeed, previous research that did 
not support preferential selection of inconsistency in scenes led to a null result when examining 
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free viewing, finding that inconsistent and (low-informative) consistent objects were selected on 
similar timescales (Coco et al., 2013; Gareze & Findlay, 2007; Henderson et al., 1999; Võ & 
Henderson, 2009, 2011). So far, except for Coco et al. (2013), who found a consistency 
prioritisation in the object naming task, any report of an advantage of consistent objects over 
inconsistent object selection has originated from visual search, which emphasises the importance 
of matching with expectations in order to perform efficiently (e.g., Castelhano & Heaven, 2011; 
Eckstein, Drescher & Shimozaki, 2006; Henderson et al., 1999; Spotorno, Malcolm & Tatler, 
2014, 2015; Võ & Henderson, 2011).  
 Considering the duration of foveal information gathering once the object has been 
selected, virtually every study on the topic has reported so far longer inspection of inconsistent 
than of consistent objects (see Introduction and Discussion Experiment 1 for references). 
Experiment 2 showed this pattern regardless of the informativeness of the consistent object but 
also confirmed that it was limited to specific conditions of salience. Indeed, when comparing 
inconsistent to diagnostic objects, longer inspection on the inconsistent objet was reported when 
either the diagnostic object was low in salience, replicating and extending therefore what was 
shown in Experiment 1, or the inconsistent object was high in salience (whereas no modulation 
due to inconsistent object salience had been reported in Experiment 1). When comparing 
inconsistent to consistent but marginally informative objects, we found longer inspection on the 
inconsistent object except when the non-diagnostic object (inconsistent or marginal) was high in 
salience and co-occurred with a low salience diagnostic object. In addition, diagnostic objects 
were fixated for longer than consistent, marginally informative competitors, suggesting that 
greater attentional engagement may arise from the attempt of maximising information about the 
scene’s meaning. This effect was true in all salience conditions, except when a low salience 
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diagnostic object competed with a high salience consistent but marginally informative object; in 
this case, inspection time was longer on the marginal object. There was also a suggestion, but 
only in Experiment 2, that the presence of a perceptually salient diagnostic object might promote 
longer inspection of co-occurent inconsistent (therefore highly informative) objects in the scene. 
Previous work has found that physical properties influence inspection times: Wang, 
Hwang and Pomplun (2010), who examined visual conspicuity considering size, showed that 
inspection time on high predictable objects in scenes was longer when they were large. However, 
effects of perceptual properties on inspection times in our results did not arise from the sizes of 
objects, with high and low salience critical objects being of similar size in our scenes (see 
Experiment 1 Method).  
Taken together, the findings of Experiments 1 and 2 clearly revealed that objects 
contributing the most to a scene’s (event) gist definition (i.e., diagnostic) are prioritised during 
free viewing, and also that informativeness arising from inconsistency within the scene leads to 
some prioritisation if compared to selection of objects that are consistent with but marginally 
informative for scene understanding.  They also showed clear differences in the impact of 
perceptual salience on attention allocation according to the semantic consistency and 
informativeness of the objects.  
However, while these patterns emerged with respect to scene exploration, we do not 
know whether they would persist when the critical informative objects compete for prioritisation 
within scene representation in visual working memory. In other words, we do not know whether 
and how the diagnostic object and the inconsistent object would compete in terms of visual 
awareness and utilisation of representation to guide behaviour. In order to explore this question, 
Experiment 3 employed a flicker change detection task (see Rensink et al., 1997), where the 
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diagnostic object and the inconsistent object appeared or disappeared simultaneously: successful 
change detection requires both object selection during viewing and during retrieval and 
comparisons of the working memory traces of the original and the modified scene (see Rensink, 
2002, and Introduction). In Experiment 3, we did not measure eye movements because we were 
not interested in re-characterising oculomotor behaviour during viewing, but rather at 
characterising any effects of semantic and perceptual factors on the resultant memory 
representations that support detection of change. We utilised two different versions of the task, 
requiring participants to detect either both changing objects or only one of the two changes. In 
this way, we were able to manipulate the cognitive load imposed by the task, and to analyse its 
influence on object competition and on interplay between semantic and perceptual factors.  
 
Experiment 3 
Method 
Participants. Sixty students of the University of Aberdeen, participated in the 
experiment for no remuneration. They all had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Thirty were 
randomly assigned to the version of the experiment requiring detection of both changes (seven 
males, aged 19-44, M = 22.37, SD = 5.39) and the other thirty were randomly assigned to the 
version requiring detection of only one of the two co-occurring changes (ten males, aged 19-36, 
M = 22.21, SD = 4.99). One participant in the detection of only one change condition, however, 
was excluded from all analyses due to too many errors, therefore the participants effectively 
considered for this condition were 29. A two-tailed, independent-sample t test, t (57) = 1.04, p = 
.301 showed that the two groups did not differ significantly in terms of their Laterality Quotient 
measured at the Edinburgh Laterality Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). The experiment was approved 
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by the local Ethic Committee of the School of Psychology and carried out in accordance with the 
provisions of the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki. All participants provided 
written informed consent prior to participating. 
 
Materials and Apparatus. We used the same scenes used in the Experiment 1, but only 
for the versions (original and mirror orientations) with both or no critical objects present. We 
also used four scenes for practice selected from the same image database (see Spotorno et al., 
2013). All the scenes were sized 19 ×14 cm, 610 × 440 pixels, and were presented in the centre 
of the screen on a medium grey background (127, 127, 127) on a DELL CRT screen (37.7 x 30.3 
cm, 1024 x 768 pixels, resolution 85 Hz). Responses were provided by clicking on a computer 
mouse. Viewing distance was not controlled in this experiment but was relatively consistent 
across participants as all sat in front of the monitor at a comfortable distance for using the 
computer mouse. 
 
Procedure. The experiment was conducted individually in a dimly illuminated room. 
Participants were seated in front of the computer screen, at a viewing distance of approximately 
60 cm, and had to click with the computer mouse (using the right hand) on a changing object as 
quickly and accurately as possible. Each trial started with a central fixation square (30 x 30 
pixels) displayed on a medium-grey (127, 127, 127) background for 1000 ms and consisted of 
alternations of the scene versions without or with the two critical objects, each presented for 100 
ms and separated by a 900-ms medium-grey blank screen4 (Figure 11). After detection of one or 
both changes, according to the experimental condition, or after 60 s elapsed, the full version of 
the scene (containing both critical objects) was presented again in the centre of the screen until 
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participants reconfirmed their choice by clicking again on the object(s); in the two-change 
condition, participants were required to indicate the objects in the same order they did during 
online change detection. This phase was included in the trial to ensure that the order that 
participants clicked on the changes during the trial reflected the order that they noticed these 
changes. Thereafter, the trial ended automatically and the experiment proceeded to the next. 
 
FIGURE 11 ABOUT HERE 
 
The experimental trials were presented in random order and the scene orientation was 
counterbalanced across participants. Each scene was presented only in one trial during the 
experiment. 
Order of detection and accuracy were recorded and analysed for each trial. A mouse click 
was considered correct if the indicated location was within the ROI of the critical object. The 
response time for each mouse click was also recorded and were analysed for the first response in 
the trial.  
 
Data Analysis. We discarded from analyses error trials (indicating the wrong object5 or 
detecting only one change when detection of both changes was required: 15 trials) and inversions 
(where there was a mismatch between the order of selection during the trial and during the 
confirmation screen for the two-change detection version of the experiment, as we could not be 
sure of the order in which the changes were noticed: 2 trials). We then excluded trials in which 
the response time to detect the change (the first change in version of the experiment when 
participants were asked to detect both changes) was longer than three standard deviations from 
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the mean (24 trials), or were made before the second version of the scene appeared and were 
therefore too short to be detections of the change (0 trials). For the version when participants 
detected two changes, we also excluded any trials in which the second click was made 
immediately after the first as in these cases the order of detection was less clear; for this we 
employed a minimum gap between the two responses of 0.5 seconds (only 1 trial was excluded 
because of this). In total, 42 trials, corresponding to the 4.4% of total data, were removed prior to 
analysis.  
In the one-change-detection version of the experiment, there were two changing objects, 
one diagnostic and one inconsistent, therefore the chance of detecting the inconsistent change 
was 50%. In the two-change-detection version, there were again two changing objects, and we 
only considered trials in which both objects were correctly detected; therefore, there was a 50% 
chance that the first detected change was inconsistent.  
As for Experiments 1 and 2, analyses were run using the lmer() function of the lme4 
package (Bates et al., 2015) in the R programming environment (The R Foundation for Statistical 
Computing, Version 3.0.3, 2014). We report the predictors’ coefficients (β-values), the SE-
values, the z-values for GLMMs or the t-values for LMMs, and the associated p-values 
(generated using the lmerTest library, Kuznetsova et al., 2016, in the case of LMMs). As for 
Experiments 1 and 2, we report significant effects and tendencies toward significance (.05 < p < 
.1). Significant interactions were further analysed with follow-up models. Participants and scenes 
were specified as random effects in all the models. Graphics were created using the ggplot2 
package (Wickham, 2009). 
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Results 
Prioritising informative objects in scene representations. In order to characterise not 
only online information selection but also its availability within representations in visual working 
memory, we considered which of the two changing objects was detected first. Inconsistent object 
salience (low, high), diagnostic object salience (low, high), and the task of the observer (find one 
change, find two changes) were entered as predictors in a GLMM that analysed the probability of 
detecting the inconsistent change first (Model 12.1). Only responses on trials in which both 
objects were correctly identified (by mouse click) after the trial were analysed here (see 
Method).  
The probability of detecting changes to the inconsistent object first differed between the 
tasks of the observer, β = 0.272, SE = .100, z = 2.71, p = .007, with a higher probability of 
selecting the inconsistent object first when participants were asked to detect only one change (M 
= .49, SD = .50) than when participants were asked to detect both changes (M = .40, SD = .49).  
There were also effects of the salience of the inconsistent object, β = 1.20, SE = .253, z = 
4.75, p < .001, and the salience of the diagnostic object, β = .504, SE = .249, z = 2.02, p = .043. 
These effects were qualified by a three-way interaction between the salience of the inconsistent 
object, the salience of the diagnostic object and the task of the observer, β = 0.179, SE = .089, z = 
2.01, p = .045 (Figure 12). 
 
FIGURE 12 ABOUT HERE 
 
To follow up this interaction we first ran one-sample t-tests to compare selection of the 
inconsistent object to chance in each condition (chance value = .50, see Data Analysis). When 
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the salience of both critical objects was low, participants were less likely than chance to detect 
the inconsistent change first when looking for one change, t (28) = 3.00, p = .006, and when 
looking for two changes, t (30) = 10.30, p < .001. When the salience of the inconsistent object 
was high and the salience of the diagnostic object was low, participants were more likely than 
chance to detect the inconsistent change when looking for one change, t (28) = 11.34, p < .001, 
or two, t (30) = 5.90, p < .001. When the salience of the inconsistent object was low and the 
salience of the diagnostic object was high, participants detected the inconsistent less frequently 
than expected by chance when looking for one change, t (28) = 7.76, p < .001, or two, t (30) = 
9.06, p < .001. When both objects were high in salience, participants were equally likely to 
detect either change as the first. 
We ran follow-up GLMMs to break down the three-way interaction identified in the 
GLMM above. When the task was to detect only one of the changing objects (Model 12.2), there 
was an effect of the salience of the inconsistent object, β = 1.26, SE = .290, z = 4.35, p < .001, 
with a higher probability that the participant detected the changing inconsistent object when it 
was of high salience than when it was of low salience. There was also an effect of the salience of 
the diagnostic change, β = .709, SE = .272, z = 2.61, p = .009, with a higher probability of 
detecting the inconsistent change when the changing diagnostic object was low in salience than 
when it was high in salience.  
When the task was to detect both of the changes (Model 12.3), there was an effect of the 
salience of the inconsistent change, β = 1.15, SE = .262, z = 4.41, p < .001, but no effect of the 
salience of the diagnostic object. The interaction between the saliences of the inconsistent and 
diagnostic objects tended toward significance, z = 1.85, p = .065. Because of our theoretical 
interest in the interplay between the two critical objects, we broke down this marginal interaction 
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using a GLMM to look at simple effects (Model 12.4). When the salience of the inconsistent 
change was low, the salience of the diagnostic object had no influence on which object was 
selected first (Figure 12, right panel, light grey bars). However, when the salience of the 
inconsistent change was high, the probability of detecting it first was modulated by the salience 
of the diagnostic change, β = 1.74, SE = .734, z = 2.37, p = .018, with a higher frequency of 
detecting the inconsistent object first when the diagnostic change was of low salience than when 
the diagnostic change was of high salience (Figure 12, right panel, dark grey bars). 
In order to compare detection of competing inconsistent and diagnostic changes directly 
in the two versions of the task, we ran Welch two-sample t-tests for each consistency x salience 
condition (Bonferroni corrected α = .05/4). When the two changes were both of low salience, we 
found that detection of diagnostic changes as first was greater when participants had to report 
both changes than when they had to report only one, t (49.8) = 3.30, p = .002. We found no 
effects of task version when the consistent and the inconsistent changes were both of high 
salience or when they differed in salience. 
 
Response time for first detection. Response times were log-transformed in order to 
meet LMM assumptions. In an LMM, we entered the consistency of the first changed detected 
(inconsistent, diagnostic), the salience of the inconsistent change (low, high), the salience of the 
diagnostic change (low, high) and the observer’s task (detect one change, detect two changes) as 
predictors of the RT of the first detection (Model 13.1).  
The salience of the diagnostic change influenced how quickly the first change was 
detected, β = .027, SE = .012, t = 2.27, p = .040, with first detections being faster when the 
diagnostic object was of high salience (M = 3.86 s, SD = 1.67) than when it was low in salience 
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(M = 4.30 s, SD = 1.49). This factor did not interact with any other predictors in the model, 
suggesting that having a high salience diagnostic change in the scene reduced the time needed to 
find the first change, irrespective of whether participants detected the inconsistent or diagnostic 
change first. The only other significant effect in the model was an interaction between the 
semantics of the first detected change and the salience of the inconsistent object, β = .025, SE = 
.005, t = 5.34, p < .001. A follow-up LMM (Model 13.2) was run to consider simple effects 
within this interaction. When the inconsistent object was detected first, the time to detect it was 
modulated by its salience, β = .070, SE = .025, t = 2.74, p = .013, with faster detection of the 
inconsistent change when it was of high salience (M = 3.87 s, SD = 1.57) than when it was of 
low salience (M = 4.71 s, SD = 1.54). However, when the diagnostic change was detected first, 
the time to detect it was not influenced by the salience of the inconsistent object. 
 
Discussion 
Three key findings in Experiment 3 inform current understanding of how low-level 
salience and semantic informativeness in terms of consistency with gist influence scene 
processing and representation. 
First, perceptual salience had a dominant influence, in line with some previous change 
detection studies (Anderson & Donk, 2017; Pringle et al., 2001; Spotorno & Faure, 2011; but see 
e.g., Stirk & Underwood, 2007). When one of the changing objects was higher in perceptual 
salience, it had a higher probability of being the first detected, independently of its consistency. 
Furthermore, when both objects were highly salient, no advantage due to consistency emerged, 
with both changes having the same probability of being the first detected. Finally, the salience of 
the change also affected response times, with high salience diagnostic objects generally speeding 
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detection of the first change (irrespective of its semantics), and high salience of the inconsistent 
object speeding first detection times only when the inconsistent was detected first. 
Second, the task of the observer influenced the impact of salience and consistency. When 
detection of only one change was required, which change was likely to be detected depended 
upon the perceptual salience of both changing objects. When the two changes both had to be 
detected, the influence of diagnostic object salience on the type of change detected first was 
limited to the cases in which the inconsistent object was highly salient, while a low salience, 
inconsistent object was overshadowed by the presence of a diagnostic object in the scene, 
regardless of the salience of the diagnostic object. This suggests that a higher cognitive load 
imposed by the task enhances reliance on the scene’s gist. Moreover, the persistent and coherent 
effect of the salience of the inconsistent object in both tasks is in agreement with the notion that 
salience acts as surprise signature (e.g., Itti & Baldi, 2009), whose influence is therefore 
potentiated in association with observations conflicting with viewers’ beliefs about the semantic 
coherence of scene context.  
Third, we found an advantage for diagnostic objects compared to inconsistent objects, 
which emerged specifically when both targets were of low salience and, thus, no low-level 
critical object prioritisation could occur. This advantage was greater when two changes had to be 
detected than when only one had to be detected, supporting our suggestion that higher cognitive 
load enhances reliance on the scene’s gist. In previous work, we found better detection of 
diagnostic than inconsistent changes for highly salient additions or, regardless of salience, for 
deletions (Spotorno et al., 2013). In contrast, semantic effects of prioritisation of diagnostic over 
inconsistent objects emerged only for low salience objects in the present study. This apparent 
discrepancy may stem from several sources that may lead to different perceptual processes. First, 
THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM 53 
the inclusion of two changes rather than one change in each scene, putting diagnostic and 
inconsistent objects directly in competition, although, as we described above, it should be noted 
that the advantage due to diagnosticity emerged also when the task was to detect only one of the 
two changing objects. Second, the use of the flicker paradigm in the present study, that allows 
for accumulation of information about the scene (e.g., Vierk & Kiesel, 2008), rather than a one-
shot change detection paradigm, in which detection is based on representation formed from only 
very brief and single scene presentation at each trial. Third, differences associated with the type 
of change in Spotorno et al. (2013), where only an addition or only a deletion was made in each 
trial, whereas in the present study we alternated these two types of changes within the same trial, 
as a result of the flickering. 
 
General Discussion 
Despite a long history of work on the importance of the match between the semantics of 
an object and the scene in which it occurs (since the seminal work in the 1970s-80s of 
Biederman et al., 1982; Boyce, Pollatsek & Rayner, 1989; Friedman, 1979; Loftus & Macworth, 
1978; Palmer, 1975), this is the first study to have examined the situation of direct competition 
between semantically diagnostic and inconsistent objects in the same scene. Moreover, we 
examined how this competition may be modulated by the perceptual properties of the objects. 
We used two different paradigms in order to approach these questions from different 
perspectives. In the first two experiments, we considered perceptual or semantic influences 
during scene viewing for memorisation, focusing on any evidence of extrafoveal processing and 
selection prioritisation of objects’ semantic or perceptual information, and on differences in 
foveal processing. In the third experiment, using a change detection task, we examined how 
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semantic and perceptual properties of informative objects, either diagnostic or inconsistent, may 
also influence the incorporation into, and availability from, scene representations. 
 
Semantic and perceptual prioritisation in scene processing  
Regarding object semantics, we found that, when compared to diagnostic objects, 
inconsistent objects were looked at later in scene viewing (Experiments 1 and 2) and were less 
likely to be detected first if changing in a flicker paradigm (Experiment 3). A residual 
prioritisation benefit, in terms of earlier ocular selection, due to inconsistency was found only 
when inconsistent objects were compared to objects that were consistent but marginally 
informative with respect to scene meaning (Experiment 2). Our results concerning object 
semantic guidance have three main implications. First, they indicate that previous controversial 
evidence about an inconsistency advantage for selection prioritisation during viewing (e.g., 
Bonitz & Gordon, 2008; Brockmole & Henderson, 2008; Cornelissen & Võ, 2017; Hollingworth 
& Henderson, 2003; Loftus & Mackworth, 1978; Stirk & Underwood, 2007; Underwood et al., 
2007, 2008) may have arisen from a bias in informativeness per se, due to comparisons with 
poorly informative objects. Second, they corroborate previous research, carried out in the change 
detection domain, which considered consistent/diagnostic and consistent/low informative objects 
and showed that informativeness in terms of diagnosticity for scene leads to preferential 
selection (O’Regan et al., 2000; Pringle et al., 2001; Rensink et al., 1997, 2000; Spotorno & 
Faure, 2011). We reinforce this earlier claim by demonstrating that diagnosticity prioritisation 
holds true even when removing the imbalance in informativeness between the compared objects. 
Third, by showing that the importance of the object for scene meaning acts as a source of 
guidance for fixation selection (Experiments 1 and 2), we support the claim that objects may be 
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recognised extrafoveally, at least to an extent that enables a first understanding of object-context 
semantic associations.  
Regarding perceptual properties, we showed that objects that were high in perceptual 
salience were prioritised compared to low salience objects during both scene viewing and when 
searching for changes in a scene. These findings are broadly in line with accounts that posit an 
important involvement of low-level guidance in scene processing (e.g., Borji et al., 2013a; Coco 
et al., 2013; Itti & Koch, 2000; Latif et al., 2014; Parkhurst et al., 2002; Pringle et al., 2011; 
Spotorno & Faure, 2011; Underwood & Foulsham, 2006). That said, clear differences in how 
perceptual and semantic factors interacted emerged across the two paradigms we used, 
highlighting the influence of the type of task, and of the task’s cognitive load, on how observers 
utilise these objects’ properties in order to guide attentional allocation and information 
representation. 
 
Task oriented prioritisations during scene viewing and working memory 
When the purpose is to explore the image in order to maximise information gathering 
about the whole scene (free-viewing for subsequent memorisation test), semantic factors clearly 
dominate selection of objects and the impact of an object’s perceptual salience becomes 
subordinate to that of the semantic associations between the object and the context of the scene. 
In particular, observers seem to adopt a strategy favouring overall understanding of the event 
depicted in the scene despite possible local violations and, therefore, prioritising diagnostic 
(highly consistent and relevant) information. Secondary to this, we found that semantically 
inconsistent objects appear to be prioritised relative to perceptually matched objects that were 
consistent with the scene but of low importance for understanding the depicted event.  
THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM 56 
When the purpose is to focus on specific local information (i.e., detecting changing 
objects), observers seem to switch to a strategy that utilises low-level properties as the key 
dimension guiding behaviour, at least when the scenes are presented quickly as in our flicker 
task. Indeed, in the absence of a specific template indicating the appearance of the object to look 
for and under considerable time pressure, selecting objects that are the most visible in the scene 
may be a useful principle in tasks requiring local focusing and representation. Semantics in this 
case appear to act as a subsidiary source of guidance when preferential attentional allocation to 
the changing objects cannot be based on their perceptual salience, and especially when the 
cognitive load imposed by the task is high.  
As an alternative explanation for the differences found between our two paradigms, 
object prioritisation within scenes might be based mainly on object-context semantic associations 
during scene viewing and mainly on perceptual salience during the subsequent representational 
processing in visual working memory required by the change detection task. Previous research, 
indeed, has demonstrated specific effects of low-level features on working memory 
representations, increasing memory for high salience objects and decreasing memory for low 
salience objects (e.g., Fine & Minnery, 2009; Pedale & Santangelo, 2015; Santangelo, 2015). 
However, these working memory effects appear related mainly to encoding (Santangelo & 
Macaluso, 2013), that is to say to the phase dependent on selection during viewing, and therefore 
could indirectly arise from the impact of perceptual features on scene viewing behaviour. In 
addition, it has been shown that object-scene semantic associations also affect memory contents, 
with a retrieval advantage for consistent compared to inconsistent objects (Silva, Groeger & 
Bradshaw, 2006). These previous findings lead us to think that the differential impact of salience 
and semantic consistency we found in our study, and the modulations of the interplay between 
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these two factors, are largely the genuine result of different task-oriented prioritisations in free-
viewing for memorisation versus change detection conditions. 
 
The validity of the scenes 
The type of scenes used in this study deserves careful consideration. Cartoon depictions 
were chosen to manipulate perceptual salience of diagnostic, consistent but marginally 
informative and inconsistent objects appropriately, within stimuli illustrating meaningful events 
and maintaining some properties of natural scenes, like realistic organisation, 
foreground/background relationships, object proportions, gravitational support and colour (all 
crucial aspects in scene perception, e.g., Oliva & Schyns, 2000). Crucially, the utilisation of 
drawings allowed us to produce changes in object presence without altering visual contextual 
properties, like 3D cues or shadows. Drawings have played an important role in the debate about 
the importance of inconsistency in scene perception, being used in the earliest work in this 
debate (e.g., Biederman et al., 1982; Boyce et al., 1989; Loftus & Mackworth, 1978; Palmer, 
1975) and in key papers over the last few decades (e.g., De Graef et al., 1990; Gareze & Findlay, 
2007; Gordon, 2004; Henderson et al., 1999; Hollingworth & Henderson, 1998, 1999, 2003). 
Our scenes, however, differ from real-world scenes in important properties, such as 
perspective and shadows, and are likely to be sparser. We may wonder whether the relative 
reliance upon the objects’ visual features and semantics would differ in more crowded scenes: as 
crowding does not impair detection, but identification or discrimination (see Whitney & Levi, 
2011), in crowded scenes the effects of semantics might be less pronounced as they are based on 
some access to object identity (although not necessarily on fine identification). The salience 
influence might be relatively unaffected by the level of crowding, especially if based purely on 
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feature detection (e.g., Felisberti, Solomon & Morgan, 2005). This evidence arises, however, 
from research utilising simple stimuli, as no study has focused on the effect of crowding on 
salience and semantic influences in either real-world or realistic scenes. It remains unclear, 
therefore, whether the properties of our scenes might have modulated the relative magnitude of 
semantic and salience effects. Despite this eventuality, we argue that these aspects have not 
affected the validity of our conclusions, in particular about the interaction between high- and 
low-level factors, for several reasons. First, the nature of visual representations does not seem 
essentially different between of photographic and non-photographic scenes (Tatler & Melcher, 
2007). Moreover, the scenes we utilised in the different conditions of consistency and salience 
had similar complexity considering their layout and the number of objects, as rated by 
independent observers (see Experiment 1 Method). These subjective estimates may predict 
performance to the same extent as objective measures of crowding, like feature congestion or 
edge density (Neider & Zelinsky, 2011). Finally, our modelling analysis including the scenes as 
random factor removed interferences from scene idiosyncrasies. 
 
Conclusion 
We can conclude that not all informativeness for scene understanding is the same, and 
that the ongoing task may shape the utilisation of semantic and perceptual properties of the 
stimulus as well as how these properties interact. High-level and low-level sources of guidance 
may be utilised flexibly in order to achieve different purposes and optimise behaviour 
consequently. 
What, if any, specific influence of inconsistency on selection behaviour can be found? 
The present findings show that inconsistency may act as an interfering (and covert) influence on 
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the basic attempt to make sense of the visual world primarily by normalising it according to 
observers’ expectations. This interference seems restricted to when the inconsistent object is also 
perceptually salient in the scene. Moreover, the conflicting evidence with respect to scene 
meaning and expectations confers to inconsistency a relative attentional prioritisation during 
viewing only if compared to consistent information that is not important for interpreting the 
situation depicted in the scene.  
How generalisable are these findings? This remains the open challenge for further 
research on the topic. Future studies will have to show us – in different visual settings, especially 
real-world environments, and in different visual tasks – whether and how observers do maximise 
consistent information that is relevant for current understanding of the scene and for the type of 
task, and whether and how they are able to use low-level properties in order to achieve cognitive 
and functional goals. But at least from our findings we can suggest that it is not necessarily the 
elephant in the room that will be prioritised for inspection and representation, unless the room we 
are in is part of a zoo or the elephant is visually salient against its background.  
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Notes 
1. As an alternative measure of how long it took to first fixate the critical objects, we considered 
the time from the onset of the scene to the first fixation on the critical object. While fixation 
number and time are highly correlated, it is possible that, if processing time in fixations differed 
between our experimental conditions, these two analyses might show differences. However, an 
LMM to predict time to first fixate the critical object showed the same pattern of significant 
effects as our reported model of the ordinal fixation number. 
 
2. In Aberdeen, images were displayed at 1440 x 1080 pixels on a monitor with display 
resolution set to 1920 x 1080, viewed at a distance of 72 cm. In Glasgow, images were displayed 
at 1142 x 858 pixels on a monitor with display resolution set to 1920 x 1080, viewed at a 
distance of 57 cm. In Nice, images were displayed at 999 x 756 pixels on a monitor with display 
resolution set to 1024 x 768, viewed at a distance of 57 cm. 
 
3. Note that we also found the same effect of object semantics, the same two-way interactions 
between object semantics and diagnostic object salience and between object semantics and 
inconsistent object semantics as we did in Experiment 1. The only difference in the pattern of 
significant effects between Experiment 2 and Experiment 1 was that the overall effect of 
diagnostic salience found in Experiment 1 approached by did not reach significance in 
Experiment 2 (p = .076). 
 
4. The durations of the scenes and the blank screen separating the scenes were piloted. A 
previous experiment involving 28 subjects, who did not take part in the present study, utilised the 
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same procedure but with presentation times for the scenes and the blank screen of 500 ms and 
250 ms, respectively. In this case, participants in some trials reported the impression of detecting 
both changes simultaneously or almost simultaneously. To reduce considerably this potential 
confound, we conducted further tests on five further subjects, who were not involved in the 
present study either. We found that shortening scene duration (i.e., the possibility of information 
gathering at each presentation) to 100 ms and lengthening blank screen duration (i.e., the period 
of potential decay of the mnestic representation) to 900 ms eliminated subjective reports of 
simultaneous detection. For a discussion of the impact of scene and interval durations on change 
detection performance, see Rensink et al. (2000). 
 
5.  As for the experimental version requiring detection of both changes, a trial was considered 
incorrect if each critical object was not selected during the presentation of the A/A’ cycle or 
when the scene reappeared at the end of the trial. As for the experimental version requiring 
detection of only one change, however, we considered correct all the trials in which participants 
selected one of the two critical objects at least when the scene reappeared at the end of the trial. 
This is because in this version of the experiment, in the attempt of maximising their speed, 
participants sometimes (9.9% of the trials) did not follow the instruction of clicking in the 
location of the changing object during online detection, and in these cases just clicked on the 
scene wherever the mouse pointer was positioned while they spotted the change. 
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Appendix 1: Model structures 
Model 1.1 (Diagnostic vs Inconsistent object) 
Ordinal first fixation number on object ~ Side of Screen * Object Semantics * Diagnostic Object 
Salience * Inconsistent Object Salience + (1 + Object Semantics + Diagnostic Object Salience + 
Inconsistent Object Salience + Object Semantics:Diagnostic Object Salience + Object 
Semantics:Inconsistent Object Salience ||Subject) + (1|Scene) 
 
Model 1.2 (Inconsistent object only) and Model 1.3 (Diagnostic object only) 
Ordinal first fixation number on object ~ Side of Screen * Diagnostic Object Salience * 
Inconsistent Object Salience + (1 + Side of Screen + Diagnostic Object Salience:Inconsistent 
Object Salience ||Subject) + (1|Scene) 
 
Model 2.1 (Diagnostic vs Inconsistent object) 
Log(Total fixation time)  ~ Object Semantics * Diagnostic Object Salience * Inconsistent Object 
Salience + (1 + Object Semantics + Diagnostic Object Salience + Inconsistent Object Salience  
+ Object Semantics: Diagnostic Object Salience + Diagnostic Object Salience:Inconsistent 
Object Salience||Subject) + (1|Scene) 
 
Model 2.2 (simple effects) and Model 2.3 (simple effects) 
Log(Total fixation time)  ~ Object Semantics by Diagnostic Object Salience * Inconsistent 
Object Salience + (1 + Object Semantics + Diagnostic Object Salience + Inconsistent Object 
Salience||Subject) + (1|Scene) 
 
Where Object Semantics by Diagnostic Object Salience is a four-level factor describing this 
interaction, contrast coded for simple effects 
 
Model 3.1 
Ordinal first fixation number on diagnostic object ~ Side of Screen * Diagnostic Object Salience 
* Competition Type + (1 + Diagnostic Object Salience: Competition Type ||Subject) + (1|Scene) 
 
Model 4.1 (Diagnostic vs Inconsistent ROIs) 
Probability of fixating ROI ~ ROI Semantics * Diagnostic Object Presence * Inconsistent Object 
Presence + (1 + ROI Semantics:Diagnostic Object Presence ||Subject) + (1|Scene) 
 
Model 4.2 (Inconsistent ROI only) 
Probability of fixating ROI ~ Diagnostic Object Presence * Inconsistent Object Presence + (1 + 
Diagnostic Object Presence + Inconsistent Object Presence ||Subject) + (1|Scene) 
 
Model 4.3 (Diagnostic ROI only) 
Probability of fixating ROI ~ Diagnostic Object Presence * Inconsistent Object Presence + 
(1|Subject) + (1|Scene) 
 
Model 5.1  
Ordinal first fixation in Diagnostic ROI ~ Side of Scene * Diagnostic Object Presence * 
Inconsistent Object Presence + (1 + Diagnostic Object Presence ||Subject) + (1|Scene) 
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Model 5.2 (simple effects)  
Ordinal first fixation in Diagnostic ROI ~ Side of Scene * Presence of the Two Objects + 
(1|Subject) + (1|Scene) 
 
Where Presence of the Two Objects is a four-level factor describing this interaction, contrast 
coded for simple effects 
 
Model 6.1 (Diagnostic vs Inconsistent object) 
Ordinal first fixation number on object ~ Object Semantics * Diagnostic Object Salience * 
Inconsistent Object Salience + (1 + Object Semantics + Diagnostic Object Salience + 
Inconsistent Object Salience||Subject) + (1|Scene) 
 
Model 6.2 (Inconsistent object only) 
Ordinal first fixation number on object ~ Diagnostic Object Salience * Inconsistent Object 
Salience + (1 + Diagnostic Object Salience + Inconsistent Object Salience ||Subject) + (1|Scene) 
 
Model 6.3 (Diagnostic object only) 
Ordinal first fixation number on object ~ Diagnostic Object Salience * Inconsistent Object 
Salience + (1 + Diagnostic Object Salience + Inconsistent Object Salience + Diagnostic Object 
Salience:Inconsistent Object Salience ||Subject) + (1|Scene) 
 
Model 7.1 (Diagnostic vs Marginal object) 
Ordinal first fixation number on object ~ Object Semantics * Diagnostic Object Salience * 
Marginal Object Salience + (1 + Object Semantics + Diagnostic Object Salience + Marginal 
Object Salience||Subject) + (1|Scene) 
 
Model 7.2 and 7.3 (simple effects) 
Ordinal first fixation number on object ~ Object Semantics by Diagnostic Object Salience * 
Marginal Object Salience + (1 + Object Semantics + Diagnostic Object Salience + Marginal 
Object Salience||Subject) + (1|Scene) 
 
Where Object Semantics by Diagnostic Object Salience is a four-level factor describing this 
interaction, contrast coded for simple effects of salience (Model 7.2) and semantics (Model 7.3) 
 
Model 7.4 and 7.5 (simple effects) 
Ordinal first fixation number on object ~ Object Semantics by Marginal Object Salience * 
Diagnostic Object Salience + (1 + Object Semantics + Diagnostic Object Salience + Marginal 
Object Salience||Subject) + (1|Scene) 
 
Where Object Semantics by Marginal Object Salience is a four-level factor describing this 
interaction, contrast coded for simple effects of salience (Model 7.4) and semantics (Model 7.5) 
 
Model 8.1 (Marginal vs Inconsistent object) 
Ordinal first fixation number on object ~ Object Semantics * Diagnostic Object Salience * Non-
diagnostic Object Salience + (1 + Diagnostic Object Salience + Non-diagnostic Object 
Salience||Subject) + (1|Scene) 
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Model 8.2 (simple effects) and Model 8.3 (simple effects) 
Ordinal first fixation number on object ~ Non-diagnostic Object Semantics by Non-diagnostic 
Object Salience * Diagnostic Object Salience + (1 + Diagnostic Object Salience + Inconsistent 
Object Salience||Subject) + (1|Scene) 
 
Where Non-diagnostic Object Semantics by Non-diagnostic Object Salience is a four-level factor 
describing this interaction, contrast coded for simple effects of salience (Model 8.2) or semantics 
(Model 8.3) 
 
Model 9.1 (Diagnostic vs Inconsistent object) 
Log(Total fixation time)  ~ Object Semantics * Diagnostic Object Salience * Inconsistent Object 
Salience + (1 + Diagnostic Object Salience * Inconsistent Object Salience||Subject) + (1|Scene) 
 
Model 9.2 (simple effects) and Model 9.3 (simple effects) 
Log(Total fixation time)  ~ Object Semantics by Diagnostic Object Salience * Inconsistent 
Object Salience + (1 + Object Semantics + Diagnostic Object Salience + Inconsistent Object 
Salience||Subject) + (1|Scene) 
 
Where Object Semantics by Diagnostic Object Salience is a four-level factor describing this 
interaction, contrast coded for simple effects of semantics (Model 9.2) or salience (Model 9.3) 
 
Model 9.4 (simple effects) and Model 9.5 (simple effects) 
Log(Total fixation time)  ~ Object Semantics by Inconsistent Object Salience * Diagnostic 
Object Salience + (1 + Object Semantics + Diagnostic Object Salience + Inconsistent Object 
Salience||Subject) + (1|Scene) 
 
Where Object Semantics by Inconsistent Object Salience is a four-level factor describing this 
interaction, contrast coded for simple effects of semantics (Model 9.4) or salience (Model 9.5) 
 
Model 10.1 (Diagnostic vs Marginal object) 
Log(Total fixation time)  ~ Object Semantics * Diagnostic Object Salience * Marginal Object 
Salience + (1 + Diagnostic Object Salience * Marginal Object Salience||Subject) + (1|Scene) 
 
Model 10.2 (Marginal object only) 
Log(Total fixation time)  ~ Diagnostic Object Salience * Marginal Object Salience + (1 + 
Diagnostic Object Salience * Marginal Object Salience||Subject) + (1|Scene) 
 
Model 10.3 (Diagnostic object only) 
Log(Total fixation time)  ~ Diagnostic Object Salience * Marginal Object Salience + (1 + 
Diagnostic Object Salience * Marginal Object Salience||Subject) + (1|Scene) 
 
Model 10.4 (simple effects) 
Log(Total fixation time)  ~ Object Semantics by Diagnostic Object Salience by Marginal Object 
Salience (1 + Diagnostic Object Salience + Marginal Object Salience||Subject) + (1|Scene) 
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Where Object Semantics by Diagnostic Object Salience by Marginal Object Salience is an eight-
level factor describing this interaction, contrast coded for simple effects of semantics  
 
Model 11.1 (Marginal vs Inconsistent object) 
Log(Total fixation time)  ~ Non-diagnostic Object Semantics * Diagnostic Object Salience * 
Non-diagnostic Object Salience + (1 + Non-diagnostic Object Salience||Subject) + (1|Scene) 
 
Model 11.2 (simple effects) 
Log(Total fixation time)  ~ Non-diagnostic Object Semantics by Diagnostic Object Salience by 
Non-diagnostic Object Salience (1 + Diagnostic Object Salience||Subject) + (1|Scene) 
 
Where Non-diagnostic Object Semantics by Diagnostic Object Salience by Non-diagnostic 
Object Salience is an eight-level factor describing this interaction, contrast coded for simple 
effects of semantics  
 
Model 12.1  
Probability of detecting the inconsistent change first ~ Task * Side of Scene * Diagnostic Object 
Salience * Inconsistent Object Salience + (1 + Diagnostic Object Salience + Inconsistent Object 
Salience ||Subject) + (1 + Task + Side of Scene ||Scene) 
 
Model 12.2 (Detect one change) and Model 12.3 (Detect two changes) 
Probability of detecting the inconsistent change first ~ Side of Scene * Diagnostic Object 
Salience * Inconsistent Object Salience + (1 + Diagnostic Object Salience + Inconsistent Object 
Salience ||Subject) + (1 + Side of Scene ||Scene) 
 
Model 12.4 (Detect two changes: simple effects) 
Probability of detecting the inconsistent change first ~ Salience of the Two Objects + (1 + 
Diagnostic Object Salience + Inconsistent Object Salience ||Subject) + (1 + Side of Scene ||Scene) 
 
Where Salience of the Two Objects is a four-level factor describing this interaction, contrast 
coded for simple effects 
 
Model 13.1  
Log(Time to detect first change) ~ Task * Semantics of the First Detected Change * Diagnostic 
Object Salience * Inconsistent Object Salience + (1 + Diagnostic Object Salience + Inconsistent 
Object Salience ||Subject) + (1 + Task ||Scene) 
 
Model 13.2 (simple effects)  
Log(Time to detect first change) ~ Task * Diagnostic Object Salience * Semantics of the First 
Detected Change by Inconsistent Object Salience + (1 + Diagnostic Object Salience + 
Inconsistent Object Salience ||Subject) + (1 + Task ||Scene) 
 
Where Semantics of the First Detected Change by Inconsistent Object Salience is a four-level 
factor describing this interaction, contrast coded for simple effects 
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Figure 1. Examples of scenes with the two critical objects present in Experiments 1 (top row) 
and 2 (bottom row). The four experimental conditions for perceptual salience (low vs. high) are 
depicted across columns. A-D show scenes from Experiment 1, in which each scene contains a 
diagnostic and inconsistent object as follows. A: diagnostic low salience object: flower (in hand); 
inconsistent low salience object: microphone. B: diagnostic high salience object: hat; 
inconsistent low salience object: rubber ring. C: diagnostic low salience object: spanner; 
inconsistent high salience object: balloon. D: diagnostic high salience object: traffic light; 
inconsistent high salience object: painting. E-F show versions of the scenes created for 
Experiment 2, where inconsistent objects were replaced with objects that were consistent but of 
low (marginal) informativeness for the scene. Marginal objects were matched for salience, ROI 
size and placement with the inconsistent objects they replaced.  
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Figure 2. Experiment 1: the conditional (cumulative) probability of fixating each of the two 
critical objects as a function of ordinal fixation number in viewing. The four panels correspond 
to the four possible combinations of perceptual properties of the two critical objects. Here data 
are collapsed across participants and scenes. We plot data for the first 16 fixations for 
comparability with Loftus and Mackworth (1978). 
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Figure 3. Experiment 1: the unconditional probability of fixating each of the two critical objects 
as a function of ordinal fixation number in viewing. Panels show the different perceptual 
relationships between the two critical objects. Data are shown for means calculated for each 
participant with error bars denoting one standard error of the mean across participants. Stars 
indicate pairwise comparisons that were significant after Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons (corrected α = .05/12). We plot data for the first 12 fixations for comparability with 
Loftus and Mackworth (1978). 
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Figure 4. Experiment 1: the effect of the salience of the diagnostic object on the total time spent 
fixating the critical object during viewing, shown for both the diagnostic and inconsistent 
objects. Error bars show one standard error around the mean. 
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Figure 5. Experiment 1: the probability that each of the two critical regions (diagnostic and 
inconsistent) of the scene were fixated as a function of whether or not each of the two critical 
objects was present in these ROIs. Error bars show one standard error around the mean. 
  
0
.5
1
Diagnostic absent 
Inconsistent absent
Diagnostic present 
Inconsistent absent
Diagnostic absent 
Inconsistent present
Diagnostic present 
Inconsistent present
Content of critical ROIs
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y o
f f
ixa
tin
g 
RO
I
Object type 
when present
Diagnostic
Inconsistent
THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM 82 
 
Figure 6. Experiment 2: the conditional (cumulative) probability of fixating each of the two 
critical objects as a function of ordinal fixation number in viewing. The four panels correspond 
to the four possible combinations of perceptual properties of the two critical objects. In each 
panel data are shown for trials with competition between diagnostic and inconsistent objects 
(open symbols, solid lines) and for trials with competition between diagnostic and marginal 
objects (filled symbols, dashed lines). Here data are collapsed across participants and scenes. We 
plot data for the first 16 fixations for comparability with Loftus and Mackworth (1978). 
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Figure 7. Experiment 2: the unconditional probability of fixating the diagnostic and inconsistent 
objects in trials where they were in direct competition, as a function of ordinal fixation number 
in viewing. Data plotted are between-participant means (±1 SEM). Stars indicate pairwise 
comparisons that were significant after Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons 
(corrected α = .05/12).  
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Figure 8. Experiment 2: the unconditional probability of fixating the diagnostic and marginal 
objects in trials where they were in direct competition, as a function of ordinal fixation number 
in viewing. Data plotted are between-participant means (±1 SEM). Stars indicate pairwise 
comparisons that were significant after Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons 
(corrected α = .05/12).  
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Figure 9. Experiment 2: total inspection time for the diagnostic and inconsistent critical objects. 
Left panel, the two-way interaction between diagnostic object salience and object semantics. 
Right panel, the two-way interaction between inconsistent object salience and object semantics. 
Error bars show one standard error around the mean. 
 
  
THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM 86 
 
Figure 10. Experiment 2: total inspection time for the diagnostic and marginal objects across the 
four salience conditions describing the perceptual properties of the two objects. Error bars show 
one standard error around the mean.  
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Figure 11. Example of screen shots of trial, Experiment 3 (Change Detection). This example 
shows the condition in which both the inconsistent (the pot) and the diagnostic (the sleigh) 
critical objects were highly salient. Cycles of A/A’ scenes were presented until when both 
changes were found or 60 s elapsed. This depiction does not respect the original proportions 
scene/background, as the scene is here is larger for illustration purpose. Each trial began with a 
central fixation marker, here not presented. Please refer to the Supplementary Materials for a 
full-colour version of this figure. 
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Figure 12. Experiment 3: probability of detecting the inconsistent change first, as a function of 
the perceptual salience of the diagnostic object and the perceptual salience of the inconsistent 
object (both presented and changing in each scene at the same time). The left panels shows data 
when participants were asked to find one change. The right panel shows data when participants 
were asked to find both changes in the scene. Error bars show one standard error around the 
mean. The dashed lines indicate chance level.   
 
